Guns, Words, And Constitutional Interpretation by Powe, L. A., Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 4 Article 2
Guns, Words, And Constitutional Interpretation
L. A. Powe Jr.
Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation




VOLUME 38 MAY 1997 NUMBER 4
GUNS, WORDS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
L.A. POWE, JR.*.
In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombings, Linda
Thompson, the self-appointed Acting Adjutant General of the
Unorganized Militia of the United States, proclaimed that the
Second Amendment "isn't about hunting ducks; it's about hunt-
ing politicians."' She might as well have added that we ought to
shoot a few politicians right now as a message to the rest to
wake up and stop stealing our rights.'
Thompson's statement represents the interesting, and not in-
frequent, constitutional blend of a First Amendment exercise to
promote Second Amendment rights. She readily can be distin-
* Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas. Many thanks to Philip
Bobbitt, Tom Krattenmaker, Doug Laycock, Sandy Levinson, Richard Markovits,
Glenn Reynolds, and Eugene Volokh for their extraordinarily thoughtful comments
and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
This is an expanded version of the Cutler Lecture at the William & Mary
School of Law, delivered on October 22, 1996.
1. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second Amendment Revolu-
tion: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 894 (1996) (quoting Linda
Thompson).
2. Waco and Ruby Ridge easily could be offered as examples of rights being sto-
len. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN.
L. REV. 443, 453-57 (1995) (discussing the Waco and Ruby Ridge incidents as ex-
traordinary uses of paramilitary force to suppress dissidents).
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guished from mainstream constitutional law scholars both by
profession and by example. Civil libertarians with strong First
Amendment affinities traditionally have had even less use for
the Second Amendment than gun advocates have had for the
civil liberties of others.' In general, First Amendment scholars
view the rights protected by the Second Amendment as deserv-
ing less protection than does thought.' They agree with the pre-
vailing constitutional interpretation, which holds that the First
Amendment guarantees strong individual rights to freedom of
expression while the Second Amendment guarantees no individ-
ual rights at all, only a collective right to have a very well regu-
lated militia.5 In the words of the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion (ACLU), "[e]xcept for lawful police and military purposes, the
possession of weapons by individuals is not constitutionally pro-
tected."'
A small but growing, yet increasingly frustrated, group of con-
stitutional scholars is arguing that the Second Amendment of-
fers strong protection for an individual right to possess guns.7
Wishing parity with the First Amendment, they often place a
nice wistful sentence or two about the First Amendment in their
3. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989).
4. See id. at 639-40. The notable exception to conventional scholarship is William
Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236 (1994).
5. Cf Levinson, supra note 3, at 639-40 (presenting scholars' statements re-
garding whether the Second Amendment provides individual rights or simply the col-
lective right to have a militia).
6. ACLU, The ACLU on Gun Control (last modified Oct. 2, 1996)
<http'//www.aclu.org/library.aaguns.html> (quoting the ACLU Policy on Gun Control
#47). The Southern California chapter of the ACLU has created an Internet website
to discuss its "Bill of Rights" (Amendments 1-10, 13-15, and 19). See ACLU of
Southern California, Bill of Rights (visited Oct. 21, 1996) <http://www.aclu-
sc.org/bill_of.rights.html>. Individual Amendments are discussed in a question-and-
answer format. One of the questions is, "Does the Second Amendment in any way
guarantee gun rights to individuals?" The answer is "No. The weight of historical
and legal scholarship clearly shows that the second Amendment was intended to
guarantee that states could maintain armed forces to resist the federal government."
ACLU of Southern California, Second Amendment (visited Oct. 21, 1996)
<http://www.aclu-sc.org/2nd-2.html>.
7. The literature is collected in Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 465 n.18 (1995).
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articles.' Their "conversion" rate, however, is incremental and
slow-one person at a time every so often. In the meantime,
most scholars reject the individual rights claim without seriously
considering the merits of the scholarship on both sides of the
issue. One reason is that the Supreme Court supposedly settled
the issue, rejecting an individual rights claim, more than fifty
years ago Another reason may be that the new Second Amend-
ment scholarship conflicts with the hoped-for converts' political
views. 0 Yet another reason may be that it analyzes the amend-
ment in terms of text and history." The former is unconvincing
(save for those who wish to be convinced), while the latter rests
on a claim that the dead hand of the past should rule the pres-
ent. The debate, on its present terms, seems stagnant because it
has become repetitious and stylized.
Neither First Amendment nor Second Amendment scholars,
nor any other constitutional law experts, have ever suggested
that it might be enlightening to combine the two amendments
and explore their interpretation not as a pair, but jointly never-
theless. 2 Putting the two amendments through the various
modes of constitutional interpretation yields some interesting
insights about both constitutional interpretation and preferences
for certain rights. This Article explores these insights, after first
placing Thompson's comments in the context of modern constitu-
tional doctrine.
8. Cf Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1239-41 (comparing the development of Sec-
ond Amendment jurisprudence to that of First Amendment jurisprudence).
9. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (rejecting the argument
that registration of a sawed-off shotgun violated the Second Amendment, and stating
that the Second Amendment protected organized military groups, not the individual
"right to keep and bear" a sawed-off shotgun).
10. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 642 (suggesting that many libertarians may be
embarrassed by the Second Amendment, because they support prohibitory regulation
of guns).
11. See id. at 643-51 (presenting textual and historical analyses of the Second
Amendment).
12. In a short op-ed piece for the Philadelphia Inquirer's celebration of the bicen-
tennial of the Bill of Rights, Sanford Levinson connected the two amendments, both
by noting their function of checking government power and by suggesting that if the
First Amendment fails there then may be resort to the Second. See Sanford
Levinson, The Right to Bear Arms, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 1, 1991, at 13.
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I. THE ISSUE
If both Linda Thompson's comments and my hypothetical ex-
tension of them were placed on a Constitutional Law exam, pro-
fessors would have no difficulty flunking any student who did
not recognize that Thompson's speech was protected fully by the
current positive law of the First Amendment. Most professors
probably would approve of this result. In the first place, she was
at most advocating assassination, and generalized advocacy of
violence receives full protection." Only when advocacy merges
into incitement would the speaker lose constitutional protec-
tion. 14  Second, "right now" is ambiguous as to time.
Brandenburg v. Ohio" as well as Hess v. Indiana" mandate
an immediacy of action that Thompson's words, issued over
broadcast television, lack. Third, there may be no basis for find-
ing, as also required by Brandenburg, that the prospect of atten-
dant assassination is high. 7  Thus, like Robert Watts, 8
Thompson was just letting off steam, an important safeguard
provided by a system of freedom of expression. 9
There was a time, however, when such utterances, as a mat-
ter of positive law, would have justified a jail sentence. As re-
cently as 1927, the Court held that the government could
criminalize a speech if it could have reasonably believed that the
13. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that
the First Amendment's protectioii of free speech extends to "advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation").
14. See id. (forbidding a state to punish advocacy of violence unless such speech
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action").
15. See id. (holding that the incitement must be designed to produce "imminent"
action).
16. 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (holding that the state cannot punish speech that
"amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time").
17. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that the advocacy must be not only
directed to producing lawless action, but must also be "likely to incite or produce
such action").
18. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing a
Vietnam draftee's conviction for threatening to shoot the President, and ruling that
his statement was merely crude political hyperbole).
19. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) (expounding upon the value and the necessity of free expression).
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speech might cause harm.2" It is hardly unreasonable for a leg-
islature to believe that speech advocating political assassination,
even if it is merely hyperbolic, raises the probability that kill-
ings would occur.2 Therefore, the government could prohibit
such speech. This, however, was a long time ago, during the
First Amendment Dark Ages of Schenck,22 Debs,2" Abrams,'
Gitlow,2 and Whitney.2"
A clever answer might note that the laws were aimed at pre-
venting death, injury, and the destruction of property-surely a
compelling state interest. They were narrowly tailored to ban
the statements that implicated the interest, and no less restric-
tive alternative seemed likely to work because the laws against
seditious conduct did not appear to deter all such conduct.
There certainly is no reason, though, to believe that such an ar-
gument would gain assent from the current Supreme Court, nor
does it have much academic support.
Unless the constitutional law professor were asking an inter-
pretive question about undiscussed constitutional provisions,
analysis of the Second Amendment would not matter because,
with a single limited exception, 28 no Constitutional Law
20. See id. at 371.
21. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925) ("Such utterances . . . in-
volve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten
breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none
the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accu-
rately foreseen.").
22. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
23. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
25. Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652.
26. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
27. This argument is taken from Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible
Tailoring, and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996).
28. In the third edition of their splendid casebook, Paul Brest and Sanford.
Levinson shoehorned in four pages about the Second Amendment, under the sub-
heading: "Note: An Incorporation Conundrum: The Second Amendment." PAUL BREST
& SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAxING 550-54 (3d
ed. 1992). The reason for the inclusion was Levinson's discovery of the Second
Amendment and his willingness to take it seriously. See Levinson, supra note 3.
I do not believe it an exaggeration to state that Levinson's article made Second
Amendment scholarship respectable. This Article follows the methodology used by
Levinson and our mutual colleague Philip Bobbitt. By providing a comparative con-
stitutional analysis with a well-accepted right (the First Amendment), and by evalu-
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casebooks cover the Second Amendment. 9 Our hypothetical
professor quickly could note that Thompson fails as a constitu-
tional interpreter because the Second Amendment is not about
political assassination-no constitution could be that stupid.
"Only madmen... can suppose that militias have a constitu-
tional right to levy war against the United States, which is trea-
son by constitutional definition."" Instead, by its very terms,
the Amendment is addressed to the militia and military.3 '
Therefore, it is not about duck hunting either; as John Ely has
noted: "[T]he framers and ratifiers apparently opted against
leaving to the future the attribution of purposes, choosing in-
stead explicitly to legislate the goal in terms of which the pro-
vision was to be interpreted."3
Hence for all practical purposes, the Second Amendment is a
dead letter, deader indeed than the Third Amendment, which
still could be violated at least theoretically.13 Former Harvard
Law School Dean and Solicitor General Erwin Griswold summed
ating the increased scholarship that Levinson made legitimate, I hope to add to his
analysis.
29. After much of this Article was written, the eighth edition of the Lockhart
casebook was published. See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(8th ed. 1996). In a note following its discussion of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951), the authors ask: "Does the second amendment guarantee individuals (or
groups) the right to bear arms for protection including protection against government
tyranny? If the second amendment is so construed, does the second amendment shed
light on the first?" Id. at 647 (footnote omitted). The questions are quite apt, al-
though the casebook offers no guidance on how to answer them without reading the
articles cited.
30. Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62,
69 (emphasis deleted) (citation omitted). In addition to the Treason Clause, Wills
could have cited numerous other clauses authorizing the suppressions of rebellions
and insurrections. See infra notes 522-25 and accompanying text.
31. In fairness to Thompson, she knew this. Her full statement was: "The militia
is what the Second Amendment is about, because it isn't about duck hunting, it's
about hunting politicians." But what she meant by "militia" differs greatly from what
a typical Constitutional Law scholar means.
32. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95 (1980).
33. Cf Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the occupa-
tion of striking correction officers' dormitory rooms by National Guardsmen would
constitute a violation of the officers' Third Amendment rights as long as the officers
had a possessory interest in the rooms). See generally William Sutton Fields, The
Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary Quartering of Sol-
diers, 124 MIL. L. REv. 195 (1989) (discussing the Third Amendment).
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it up tersely: "[T]hat the Second Amendment poses no barrier to
strong gun laws is perhaps the most well-settled proposition in
American constitutional law." 4 When someone of Griswold's
stature can issue such a blanket statement, it indicates that
there are others supporting this viewpoint."
If someone knew nothing about the amendments, she might
think it strange that the first of the amendments in the Bill of
Rights enjoys a robust existence, but the very next is so stunted
that it may be deemed dormant. If she knew something about
legal scholarship, she would not even have to be cynical to won-
der if the reason the First Amendment flourishes and the Sec-
ond Amendment withers is that legal elites the one, but not the
other. If that explanation should prove true, is such bias a legiti-
mate way to interpret a constitution?
36
There is no little irony in the dominant approaches to the first
two amendments. The First Amendment has been construed to
guarantee a right to advocate revolution, and almost all scholars
applaud this construction. 7 Those same First Amendment
scholars, however, would believe it absurd to construe the Sec-
ond Amendment to have anything to do with revolution or, for
that matter, any individual right. Yet among those who have
written articles, as opposed to a sentence or a paragraph, on the
Second Amendment in the last fifteen years, little credibility is
given to categorically rejecting any connection between the
Amendment and individual rights.38 A substantial body of
34. Erwin N. Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment 'Rights', WASH. POST., Nov. 4,
1990, at C7.
35. See generally Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction, in GUN CONTROL AND THE CON-
STITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT x (Robert J.
Cottrol ed., 1994) (discussing the relationship between the debate over the Second
Amendment and the debate over gun control).
36. Cf Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of
Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1713
(1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court must make substantive judgments in order
to balance the literal demands of the Constitution with the need for implied excep-
tions).
37. A significant exception to this widely held view is Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 37 (1971) (conclud-
ing that the advocacy of revolution should not be considered political speech because
it violates the very premises that justify protecting political speech).
38. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of
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scholarship, including work by Sanford Levinson, 39  Ahkil
Amar, ° and William Van Alstyne,4' has been synthesized by
Glenn Reynolds into what he calls the "Standard Model" of the
Second Amendment,42 and this model concludes that the
Amendment is precisely about revolution and individual
rights.43 The Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to bear arms because the Second Amendment is about fear
of tyranny.' Yet the Standard Model thus far remains hermeti-
cally sealed from federal judicial interpretation.
Because this growing literature has framed the Second
Amendment debate over whether there is a guarantee of an in-
dividual right to bear arms, I shall treat the debate, as ad-
dressed by the literature, on its own terms and assume that the
dichotomy is between an individual right and a generic collective
right that guarantees guns only in the context of a regulated
state militia. It should be noted, however, that adherents to the
collective right theory are split over the issue of who has the
authority to regulate the militia. The dominant view is that the
authority initially rests with the states, but is ultimately subject
to federal control. 5 Under this view, neither an individual nor
a state could control access to weapons; the Second Amendment
is rendered nugatory.46 A potential, but untested view, is that
the ultimate control rests with the states.47 This view sits un-
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983) (asserting that the Second
Amendment does guarantee an individual's right to possess weapons); Robert E.
Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599
(1982) (making a substantially similar argument).
39. Levinson, supra note 3.
40. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1205-11, 1261-62 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Fourteenth Amendment];
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-73
(1991) [hereinafter Amar, Constitution].
41. Van Alstyne, supra note 4.
42. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 464.
43. See id. at 475.
44. See id. at 469-70.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15 & 16; see also Dennis A. Henigan, Arms,
Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (1991) (discuss-
ing the significance of the "Militia Clauses" in interpreting the Second Amendment).
46. Cf Henigan, supra note 45, at 115 (explaining that the Second Amendment
cannot support insurrection because the militia is to function as an instrument of
governmental authority).
47. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and
1318
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easily with the outcome of the Civil War, and the use of the
National Guard to integrate schools in Little Rock a century
later.48 The third collective rights position is similar to the indi-
vidual rights view in that it eschews a role for government.
According to this theory, the Second Amendment rests collective-
ly with the people, who may choose to become an aroused popu-
lace to defend their liberty if it is endangered. This, indeed, is
the claim of a right to revolution;49 it looks much like the Stan-
dard Model, but is wedded to civic republicanism, and therefore
would not constitutionally protect gun ownership for self-defense
or as a hobby. This Article treats separately these greatly differ-
ing collective theories only where necessary.
II. DOING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Standard Model literature typically makes some passing
references to the First Amendment. Second Amendment litera-
ture in general, however, is so wedded to the implicit assump-
tion that originalism is the decisive mode for constitutional in-
terpretation that the authors have not perceived or explored the
interpretive interrelation of the two amendments. In hoping to
further the Second Amendment debate, my goal is modest. I am
interested only in the question of whether the Second Amend-
ment has meaning today-not in what that meaning might be in
any particular case. In determining whether the Second Amend-
ment has meaning, one first must determine which of the two
views, individual rights or collective rights, is more correct. If
the collective rights theory is correct, the Second Amendment is,
for all practical purposes, a dead letter. Thus any regulation of
guns is allowable without regard to constitutional limitation, as
States' Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1738 (1995).
48. See infra notes 532-35 and accompanying text.
49. New Hampshire and Tennessee each placed an explicit right of revolution in
their constitutions. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 472 n.44. Other states simply rec-
ognized that the people had a right to change their government if they so wished,
without specifying the means by which they might do so. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 457, 475-81 (1994) (discussing states' provisions for popular reform of govern-
mental institutions).
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Dean Griswold believed." If the individual rights theory is cor-
rect, however, then the Second Amendment must be considered,
as at least a potential constitutional barrier, in the context of
regulatory efforts. I am concerned wholly with these questions.
What I propose to do is view the two amendments together,
not as part of a general theory of constitutional law-for that
would yield only the theory's preordained result-but instead
from the perspective of a constitutional lawyer. That is, I pro-
pose to look at the two amendments in the context of doing con-
stitutional law. As Philip Bobbitt's seminal work teaches, we do
constitutional law by constructing and analyzing arguments
based on those accepted ways that we have chosen to interpret
our Constitution:5 by its text, by its history, by the structure of
the institutions the Constitution creates or recognizes, by the
decisions of the Supreme Court, by the collective traditions of
the American people, by the consequences of the decision, and
possibly by moral philosophy or natural law.52 By doing consti-
tutional law in this manner, the First Amendment, which is by
far the more familiar,53 perhaps can help us understand and
illuminate the Second.
Any rational approach to constitutional interpretation begins
with text. Because, however, one side of the debate contends that
the issues under consideration have been resolved authoritatively
by the Supreme Court, I will begin with the Court's decisions.
50. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
51. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CON-
STITUTIONAL FATE]; PHILIP BOBBITW, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
52. The perceptive reader will note that this model does not follow Bobbitt's mo-
dalities exactly. I refer to tradition where Bobbitt uses "ethical argument," and I use
consequentialism where he uses the more Bickelian "prudential argument."
See BOBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 51, at 59, 93. Finally, Bobbitt does
not accept that either natural law or a rights-based moral philosophy could be a
source of constitutional argument, while I believe that decisions like Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), cannot be understood otherwise. But see infra text accompany-
ing notes 588-91 (discussing the problems of natural law argument). See generally
Symposium, Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703
(1994) (addressing Bobbitt's theories of interpreting the constitution).
53. Because the First Amendment is more familiar, I will sketch the First Amend-
ment analysis in each modality and then devote the bulk of my attention to the
parallel Second Amendment analysis.
1320
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A. Doctrine
There is little reason to belabor First Amendment doctrine
and precedent. In the humble beginnings of Supreme Court in-
terpretation during the first quarter of the twentieth century,
the Court appeared incapable of believing that the First Amend-
ment had any meaning in addition to the protections that the
common law would offer. From Patterson54 to Whitney,55 the
Court concluded that the speech in question might have a harm-
ful effect and therefore could be suppressed.
Beginning with Near56 and Stromberg7 in 1931, and inter-
rupted only by the anticommunist crusade, the Supreme Court
made the First Amendment a bastion of individual liberty, a
process culminating in Justice Harlan's powerful opinion in Co-
hen v. California." This powerful protection for speech contin-
ues to the present as witnessed by decisions striking down bans
on pornography,59  indecency, °  hate speech,6  and flag
54. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (holding that contempt is defined
by local law, and that the Constitution did not provide any additional protection for
articles and a cartoon that disparaged the Supreme Court of Colorado, and were
ruled in contempt).
55. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (stating that the freedom of speech
is not absolute, and the state may punish those who abuse this freedom by saying
things contrary to public peace or welfare).
56. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking as unconstitutional a state
statute enjoining the publication of a scandalous newspaper, as applied to publica-
tions charging government officials with corruption).
57. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (declaring unconstitutional part of
a state statute criminalizing the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to
organized government).
58. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing the defendant's conviction for disturbing the
peace, when the conviction was based on his wearing a jacket emblazoned with
"Fuck the Draf' into a courthouse).
59. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (de-
claring unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting "pornography" because it discrimi-
nated against speech based on its content, without reference to the standard re-
quired for material to be obscene), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
60. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996)
(striking as unconstitutionally broad a provision of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which allowed cable operators to prohibit
indecent programming on public access channels); Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (holding that "dial-a-porn" amendments to the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which banned indecent interstate commercial telephone messages,
were unconstitutionally broad limitations on speech).
61. See R.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a
1322 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1311
burning.6 2 Beyond protecting the right to offend, the Court has,
contrary to the World War I cases, enshrined a right to advocate
revolution.s3 Over the years, First Amendment jurisprudence
has been so thoroughly doctrinalized that jargon dominates the
opinions:' viewpoint-neutrality and content-neutrality,65 time,
place and manner,6 secondary effects,67 compelling interest, s
least restrictive alternative,69 substantial government inter-
est,7° and four-part tests.7 As with any other mature doctrinal
area, neither the text nor its surrounding history is perceived as
city ordinance prohibiting the display of symbols that would arouse anger in others
on the basis of their race, gender, or religion).
62. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (subjecting the Flag Protec-
tion Act of 1989 to "the most exacting scrutiny," because its infringement of protect-
ed expression, and finding the Act unconstitutional); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (interpreting flag burning as expressive conduct, protected by the First
Amendment, and therefore concluding that a criminal conviction for flag burning was
unconstitutional).
63. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that advocacy of revo-
lution is constitutionally protected unless it is directed to inciting imminent lawless
action and is likely to produce such action).
64. See generally Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV.
165 (1985) (criticizing the style of recent Supreme Court opinions as relying too
heavily on formalized "tests" or "standards").
65. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388-89; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196-98
(1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-21 (1988).
66. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2412-13 (1996); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440,
2446 (1995); Burson, 504 U.S. at 197.
67. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 583-86 (1991); Boos, 485
U.S. at 320-21; Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986).
68. See, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 198-99; Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (199); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-29.
69. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 129; Boos, 485 U.S. at 326.
70. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1995); Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984); Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
71. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (establishing a four-
part test for deciding when a government regulation that incidentally burdens speech
is sufficiently justified); see also, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-72 (applying the
O'Brien test).
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being relevant to the disposition of the litigation,72 with one
possible exception.
Prior restraints doctrine is that exception. No one disputes
that the First Amendment was designed to preclude all prior
restraints.73 The fact that current doctrine would allow any pri-
or restraints makes press advocates very uneasy.4 These en-
thusiasts typically become originalists,75  and like most
originalists, they believe that any move from originalism is un-
justified.
The current doctrine on prior restraints suggests that it is
very difficult, but not impossible, to get judicial approval for one.
The "core" of the originalist conception therefore may be pre-
served-depending on whether the core is deemed a total ban on
prior restraints or just a ban on most restraints. This point is
worth making because it introduces the possibility that the
"core" of the Second Amendment similarly could be protected by
just a single decision of the Supreme Court.
Second Amendment doctrine is barely embryonic. There are
only three relevant cases: Cruikshank,71 Presser,77 and Mill-
er.78 Cruikshank has no comparison in First Amendment doc-
72. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249 (1995) (asserting that the doctrinal tests used by the Supreme Court mean lit-
tle to the actual resolution of cases); Volokh, supra note 27.
73. See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 173 (1960) (explaining that
freedom of the press initially was envisioned as freedom from prior restraints).
74. Prior restraints recently have been used in areas in which no criminal laws
exist to prohibit dissemination of the information. See McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (1995) (mem.) (denying an application to stay the district
court order that restrained publication of an article disclosing any information filed
under seal with the district court); United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1990) (denying relief from the district court order restraining broadcast of re-
corded conversations between the criminal defendant and his attorney).
75. Press advocates almost always are originalists. For a discussion of prior re-
straints by nonoriginalists, see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint:
The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethink-
ing Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); L.A. Powe,* Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55 (1990).
76. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
77. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
78. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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trine, but Presser may be compared to Patterson79 and Miller is
analogous to Schenck."
Cruikshank involved the federal convictions arising from the
Colfax Massacre in Louisiana, "the bloodiest single act of car-
nage in all of Reconstruction," in which an armed band of the
Ku Klux Klan killed more than one hundred blacks.8 In part,
indictments charged the defendants with denying the victims
their federally protected rights to peaceably assemble and to
bear arms.82 Chief Justice Waite concluded that those rights ex-
isted prior to the Constitution and therefore were not created by
it; the rights solely limited actions of the federal government,
not those of private citizens. 3 Accordingly, the defendants had
violated no federal rights." Cruikshank and the other defen-
dants only could be tried in the state courts for ordinary state
law crimes, such as murder.85
Presser flowed directly from Cruikshank. In Presser, the Court
upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting parading with arms except
when done by the organized militia. 8 The statute had been en-
acted after Chicago's railroad strike of 1877, a controversy that
left both sides arming themselves for the possibility of another
strike.8 Presser led a group of German union members who
had formed an armed, uniformed company for purposes of self-
defense.88 The Court rejected Presser's Second Amendment
claim, as it did all Bill of Rights claims against the states during
that era, because the Fourteenth Amendment was not deemed to
apply the Second Amendment to state government actions.89 Al-
though that conclusion would have been sufficient to decide the
case, the Court also noted that to deny the states the power to
79. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 494 (1907).
80. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
81. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,
at 530 (1988).
82. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875).
83. See id. at 552-53.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 559.
86. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886).
87. See PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 46 (1984).
88. See id. at 45-46.
89. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
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regulate, as Illinois had, would preclude an exercise of power
"necessary to the public peace, safety and good order.""
Two decades later, Patterson applied a similar approach to a
First Amendment argument.9' After being found in constructive
contempt for his editorials about the state supreme court,
Patterson claimed First Amendment protection for his publica-
tions.92 The Court did not decide expressly whether the First
Amendment was a limitation solely against the Federal Govern-
ment.9 3 Justice Holmes, however, noted, in dicta, that even if
the First Amendment did apply to the states, its function was
limited to prohibiting prior restraints." Because Patterson was
being punished only for what he already had written, he there-
fore would lose, regardless of whether the First Amendment ap-
plied to the states.95
Schenck breezily assumed that Patterson's dictum that the
First Amendment was limited to prohibiting prior restraints was
incorrect.96 The Court stated this new conclusion, however, in a
passing phrase.97 The Schenck opinion did not cite the text of
the First Amendment nor did it mention any history or rationale
for the inclusion of a free speech guarantee in the Bill of
Rights.98  Following the classically Holmesian approach,
Schenck just got on with it.
Schenck was convicted of conspiring to obstruct the draft by
circulating 15,000 copies of an antiwar diatribe to men eligible
for the draft.9 9 Finding the requisite mens rea for the criminal
conviction was easy: "the document would not have been sent
unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not
see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject
90. Id. at 268.
91. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
92. See id. at 458-59.
93. See id. at 462.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
97. See id. ("It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of
speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have
been the main purpose ... .
98. See id. at 52.
99. See id. at 49-51.
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to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of
it out."' ° Schenck's intent also sufficed for the Court to reject
his First Amendment claim, because if the tendency of speech is
to bring about a harm, then the speech may be punished.0 ' "If
the act, (speaking or circulating a paper), its tendency and the
intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground
for saying that success alone warrants making the act a
"102crime.
Schenck discussed the limitations on speech necessary "[wihen
a nation is at war."0 3 Gitlow expanded Schenck to include
times of peace, allowing the government to suppress speech if
that speech had any chance of undermining the government.'
The time for debating the war's origins and rationale was either
prior to the war or after peace resumed, but not during the
war.0 5 Government had the power to suppress speech that
could cause harm when government believed that to do so was
appropriate.' 6 Speech was no more protected by the First
Amendment than it was protected by the political process or the
common law had there been no First Amendment. In this sense
Patterson, not its slight revision in Schenck, was correct because
under Schenck, the only real effect of the First Amendment was
to prohibit prior restraints.
Miller, the Court's only twentieth century Second Amendment
case, involved a Congressional response to violence in the news
and movies by outlawing specific weapons identified with "the
gangster and the desperado":0 7 submachine guns and sawed-
100. Id. at 51.
101. See id. at 52.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 52.
104. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-70 (1925).
105. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 76-78 (1991) (explaining that the expression of any opposition to majoritarian
policies is especially difficult in times of crisis).
106. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 667-70.
107. Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
(No. 696); see also Kates, supra note 38, at 247 ("During the decade of Prohibition,
with its gang wars, and the subsequent depression years of John Dillinger and
Bonnie and Clyde, sawed-off shotguns and submachine guns had become widely iden-
tified in the public mind as 'gangster weapons'.").
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off shotguns.' Jack Miller and Frank Layton successfully
challenged their indictments for possession of an unregistered
sawed-off shotgun when the district judge held that the relevant
section of the National Firearms Act of 1934"9 violated the
Second Amendment." ° On direct appeal, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed."'
One can distill three separate conclusions from Miller. First,
the Second Amendment does not protect firearms that have no
"reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia."" Second, the Amendment's purpose is
"to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness
of [the militia].""3 Third, the militia is comprised of all adult
males." 4 What Miller does not do is speak with clarity to the
question constitutional law scholars now ask: What, if anything,
does the Second Amendment protect?
The dispositive paragraph -in the Miller opinion speaks of the
absence of any evidence that a sawed-off shotgun has "some rea-
sonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia" and the Court's inability to supply that evi-
dence by judicial notice."5 A reasonable reading of the
paragraph is that if there were evidence of such a relationship,
then Miller might well prevail; or perhaps, by analogy to
Schenck, if there were such evidence, then the Second
Amendment would have been implicated. The Court then would
have been called upon to explain whether the Second Amend-
ment encompassed more than a common law privilege and, if so,
under what circumstances that privilege could be defeated."'
108. See Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
109. 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
110. See United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 307
U.S. 174 (1939).
111. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 183. Justice Douglas did not participate in the case. See id.
112. Id. at 178.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 179 (discussing the historical foundation of the militia, which "com-
prised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense").
115. Id. at 178.
116. The government argued from Cruikshank that the Second Amendment created
no rights at all, but simply recognized a preexisting common law right that obvious-
ly was defeasible by appropriate regulation. See Brief for the United States at 8-9,
Miller (No. 696).
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The problem with interpreting this portion of Miller as possi-
bly protecting private possession of military weapons lies in the
remainder of the opinion. The next paragraph of the opinion sets
the tone by noting that the Constitution granted Congress power
to regulate the militia."1 The Second Amendment was intend-
ed "to assure the continuation and render possible the effective-
ness" of the militia.'18 Therefore, "[i]t must be interpreted and
applied with that end in view.""' The Court follows this con-
clusion with an extended discussion of the militia during the
period between independence and ratification. 2 ° In its conclu-
sion, the opinion notes that "[miost if not all" states have a con-
stitutional protection for bearing arms, but none would support
Miller's claim.12" ' Accordingly, the Court reversed and remand-
ed the case.'22
It is reasonable to read the second part of Miller as concluding
that the Second Amendment is about the militia and nothing
else. ' All Second Amendment claims therefore must be mea-
sured by how well they effectuate a militia."2 An individual
right to bear arms, accordingly, might well not exist." Alter-
natively, if it does exist, it would be limited to a right to bear
arms to effectuate militia purposes. 26
The standard academic reading of Miller, illustrated by John
Ely, Laurence Tribe, and Michael Dorf, is the former. 27 It is
this reading that underscores Dean Griswold's confident asser-
tion that the Second Amendment addresses the militia, not
guns. 28 Glenn Reynolds and Don Kates, by contrast, claimed
that "the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects
117. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 178-82.
121. Id. at 182.
122. See id. at 183.
123. The Government offered such a rationale as one of its three reasons for reversing
the district court judge. See Brief for the United States at 15-20, Miller (No. 696).
124. See id. at 15-16.
125. See id. at 15.
126. See id. at 18.
127. See ELY, supra note 32, at 94-95; LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF,
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1991).
128. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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some sort of individual right to keep and bear arms."2 9 Both
authors saw Miller as holding that "evidentiary hearings were
required" on remand to determine whether a sawed-off shotgun
was a militia weapon.13 Although that is plausible, an alterna-
tive reading of Miller is equally plausible. Reynolds and Kates
assumed that the "further proceedings" mentioned in the Miller
holding.' are the evidentiary hearing on the nature of the
weapon. This conclusion is not necessarily true, because even if
the Second Amendment guarantees no individual right, further
proceedings would have been required to dispose of the now-
reinstated indictment. Miller and Layton had prevailed on a
demurrer; there was no trial and therefore no finding that they
in fact possessed an unregistered sawed-off shotgun.3 2 Every
accused must either negotiate a plea or receive some form of
trial before his case is deemed to be complete.
Reynolds has admitted that "the opinion is simply not very
clear."33 He still concluded that Miller may protect individual
possession of militia weapons because the opinion cited the fa-
mous Tennessee case, Aymette v. State." Aymette, like Miller,
rejected a claim that individual possession of all weapons was
protected, explaining that citizens do not need "the use of those
weapons which are usually employed in private broils, and
which are efficient only in the hands of the robber and the as-
sassin. . . . The right to keep and bear them is not, therefore,
secured by the [Tennessee Clonstitution." 35 After finding that
the Tennessee Constitution operated like the Second Amend-
ment,136 Aymette held that if a weapon were a militia weapon,
then the Tennessee Constitution guaranteed an individual right
129. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 500; see also Kates, supra note 38, at 249 (noting
that individuals can claim rights without being members of a formal military unit).
130. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 499; see also Kates, supra note 38, at 250 (arguing
that the nonmilitary nature of sawed-off shotguns was not judicially noticeable).
131. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 183.
132. See Miller, 26 F. Supp. at 1003.
133. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 500.
134. 21 Tenn. 154 (2 Hum. 158) (1840); see Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; Reynolds, su-
pra note 7, at 500-04.
135. Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 158 (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 157 (asserting that the state constitution was adopted "[in the
same view" as was the Second Amendment).
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to keep and bear it."' Reynolds said he believes that the Miller
holding also extended the Second Amendment's protections to
individuals.
In contrast with the Aymette analysis, a different conclusion
emerges when one compares the Miller opinion with the brief
submitted by the United States. Such a comparison suggests
that Reynolds may have overread Miller because, although the
opinion did not use the examples from the government's brief, it
did relate directly to the government's arguments.
The government's brief offered three reasons for reversal. 139
The last, and the one that the Court most clearly relied on, was
that the Second Amendment protects only "those weapons which
are ordinarily used for military or public defense purposes and
does not relate to those weapons which are commonly used by
criminals." " Reynolds said he believes that this statement
embodies the complete holding of Miller and that the case was
remanded to determine whether the sawed-off shotgun was such
a weapon.1
Yet a second government argument, taken from Cruikshank,
posited that the Second Amendment guaranteed no rights at
all.' This argument looked to preexisting common law and
noted that "it cannot be doubted that at least the carrying of
weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was always a crime
under the common law of England."4 3 If Miller's hearing on
the nature of the shotgun had concluded that it was a military
weapon, then the government's argument that the Second
Amendment just incorporated the common law would bring the
appropriateness of the regulatory requirements to the fore. By
analogy to Schenck's equation of the First Amendment and the
common law,"' it is conceivable that Miller could prevail on
137. See id. at 158-60.
138. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 504.
139. See Brief for the United States at 4-5, Miller (No. 696).
140. Id. at 18.
141. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 499-500.
142. See Brief for the United States at 8-9, Miller (No. 696).
143. Id. at 9. In fact, the government's description of history is suspect. For a full-
er and better history, see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994).




the claim that a shotgun was a militia weapon and still lose on
the merits of his Second Amendment claim. The opposite also
may be true, however. Perhaps in choosing its disposition, the
Court implicitly was rejecting this government argument with-
out even addressing it. If so, Reynolds could be correct and the
opinion was tracking Aymette perfectly, finding a protected right,
but only when the defendant possesses a militia weapon.'45
The final government argument addressed the principle of
collective rights.'46 Only if individuals were "members of the
state militia or other similar military organization provided for
by law"'47 could possession of weapons be justified, because the
Second Amendment "did not permit the keeping of arms for pur-
poses of private defense." 8 The Court did not mention this
theory, but if the Court had not been concerned with collective
rights, the Miller opinion's discussion of the militia would have
been irrelevant.
There is no other constitutional law case, having supposedly
settled an issue, that is more appropriate for reconsideration or
at least elaboration. First, the Miller decision was unanimous,
often an indication that it was not carefully considered.'49 Sec-
ond, Justice McReynolds competes favorably for the position of
worst Justice of this century, suggesting that any surviving
handiwork, lacking a modern consideration, might be suspect.
Third, the Miller case was wholly one-sided, a detail realized
owly by Second Amendment scholars. After their indictment had
been quashed, Miller and Layton were free to leave the jurisdic-
tion and they apparently did, never to be heard from again. 5 '
145. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 503-04.
146. See Brief for the United States at 18-20, Miller (No. 696).
147. Id. at 5; see id. at 15.
148. Id. at 12; see id. at 15.
149. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (rejecting unanimously First
Amendment association and Equal Protection challenges to a Dallas ordinance that
required licensing of youth dance halls and restricted the halls' admission policies
and hours of operation). But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (overturning unanimously a city law banning animal
sacrifice as violative of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause because the law
burdened only members of certain religions); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115 (1992) (denying unanimously a section 1983 remedy for a municipal em-
ployee killed at work, after determining that the city's failure to train or warn em-
ployees about known hazards could not violate the Due Process Clause).
150. See Kates, supra note 38, at 248 n.189 (explaining that the defendants "simply
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No one entered an appearance for either at the Supreme
Court. 5' The government appealed, filed its jurisdictional
statement and brief, and then argued the case without opposi-
tion.'52 It's hard to lose under those circumstances. Fourth,
while those who claim that the Second Amendment guarantees
no individual right hasten to embrace Miller, they extrapolate
too much from the opinion's holding of what the Second Amend-
ment does not do and fail to address what it does do.'5'
That is the totality of the Court's Second Amendment juris-
prudence: The Amendment does not apply to the states5 " and
does not protect individual possession of weapons lacking militia
use.5 ' The former conclusion is a century old and not easily
harmonized with mid-twentieth century cases on the incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights.' The latter is a half-century old and
is a slim reed indeed for any larger proposition, such as the
assertion that Congress could prohibit the individual possession
of weapons having militia use, a category that includes most
weapons proscribed by modern Congressional legislation. More
recently, in both 1983157 and 1995,158 the Court denied certio-
rari in federal cases in which a Second Amendment incorpora-
tion claim had been raised and rejected.
disappeared into the criminal milieu from which they had involuntarily surfaced").
151. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. Nor is there any report of subsequent proceedings
in the case.
152. See id. at 174-75.
153. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 32, at 94-95; TRIBE & DORF, supra note 127, at 11.
154. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886); supra notes 86-90 and ac-
companying text.
155. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; supra notes 107-48 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a jury trial in all criminal cases for which the Sixth
Amendment would provide a jury trial, were the cases tried in federal court); see
also discussion infra Part II.D.
157. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (upholding a village gun control ordinance on the basis
that the Second Amendments limitations apply only to the National government,
thereby leaving states free to regulate weapon ownership).
158. See Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64
(1995) (finding police denial of an application to purchase a handgun justifiable un-
der the Second Amendment when the applicant failed to demonstrate that her pos-
session of a weapon would preserve or ensure the effectiveness of the militia).
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What may seem surprising is how easily the analogy of Miller
to Schenck may be replaced by a comparison of Miller to Near,
the case in which the Supreme Court held that Minnesota's
"Gag Law"15 9 was an unconstitutional prior restraint.6 ' The
Gag Law violated the First Amendment's prohibition on prior re-
straints because it dealt with libel of public officials rather than
obscenity or national security, which the Court treated as excep-
tions to the bar on prior restraints. 6 ' Near therefore protected
most but not all speech* against prior restraints.'62
If Reynolds and Kates read Miller correctly-i.e., if the Court
implicitly concluded that, if a sawed-off shotgun was a militia
weapon, then registration could not be required as a condition of
private possession' 6 3-then Near rather than Schenck is the
appropriate First Amendment analogy to the Second Amend-
ment issues in Miller. Private possession of all militia arms
would be protected by the Second Amendment and only
nonmilitia weaponry could be regulated. Although I already
have suggested that the Reynolds-Kates reading of Miller may
be incorrect, that is not the point here. It would take little for a
willing Court to read Miller as Reynolds and Kates do. If the
Court were to adopt such an interpretation, that one minor shift
would cause Second Amendment doctrine to fall into line with
the core idea of Near, rather than Schenck's common law bad
tendency test.
In retrospect, it seems strange that so much weight would be
placed on three Supreme Court decisions, two of which are pro-
foundly out of step with the jurisprudence of the last half centu-
ry. Quite simply, these opinions cannot bear the weight that has
been placed upon them. Dean Griswold was wrong; the issue has
not been resolved authoritatively by the Court.' Indeed, to
use another Miller analogy, it is as if someone read Miller v.
California,6 ' which permitted obscene publications to be
159. MINN. STAT. §§ 10123-1 to 10123-3 (1927).
160. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
161. See id. at 716.
162. See id. at 715-16.
163. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
165. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscene material is not protected by the First
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banned, and concluded that there was no right to read
Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream.
The Court eventually may hold that the Second Amendment
guarantees no individual right to keep and bear arms, but the
Court has yet to do so. The same cannot be said for the lower
federal courts 6 ' that have "uniformly held that the Second
Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual,
right."'67 Nevertheless, constitutional law scholars never have
been in the habit of deferring to the random panels of lower
courts on constitutional issues and there is no good reason why
they should do so in this one area.
B. Text
Text must be the starting point for any serious constitutional
analysis, even if it necessarily serves only as a starting point.
Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas, the two strongest
judicial supporters of First Amendment rights, proclaimed that
text was a stopping place as well. To these Justices, "no law"'68
really meant "no law." 6 ' Yet, as Sanford Levinson notes,
"literalism' is a hopelessly failing approach to interpreting [the
First Amendment]. " "' Could anyone seriously believe that the
words "no law" preclude all laws regulating speech? Perjury is
Amendment, and reformulating a three-part test to determine when a work is obscene).
166. For a critique of decisions by lower courts, see Brannon P. Denning, Can the
Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and
the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 (1995-96).
167. Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64
(1995); see also TRIBE & DORF, supra note 127, at 11 ("ITIhe Second Amendment has
not been interpreted by the courts to prohibit regulation of private gun ownership.");
Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 136 (1995) (charging Standard Model
scholars with the "failure . . . to discuss a central aspect of the legal 'truth' about
the Second Amendment-that the courts constantly reject the gun lobby's broad-indi-
vidual-right position").
168. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech . . ").
169. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("[Ulnless we once again accept the notion that the Bill of Rights means
what it says and that this Court must enforce that meaning, I am of the opinion
that our great charter of liberty will be more honored in the breach than in the ob-
servance.").
170. Levinson, supra note 3, at 644.
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speech; so is a misleading stock prospectus-are both 'therefore
protected? What counts as speech? Pornography? Draft card or
flag burning? Campaign contributions and expenditures? At best
the Constitution's text provides a rhetorical tilt toward protection
of speech and the press. Our traditions and the Court's doctrine,
not the text, have created today's strong First Amendment.
Second Amendment interpreters offer a wide variety of read-
ings of that Amendment's text. No other amendment has its own
preface. Consequently, all interpreters must decide how to bal-
ance the preface, "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State," with the subsequent clause articu-
lating a noninfringeable "right of the people to keep and bear
Arms. " 7' Levinson has noted that the Constitution was hardly
a model of linguistic clarity, and "perhaps one of the worst draft-
ed of all its provisions" was the Second Amendment. 2 Van
Alstyne has observed that "[p]erhaps no provision in the Consti-
tution causes one to stumble quite so much on a first reading, or
second, or third reading" as does the Second Amendment.'73
Even Amar's apt conclusion, that the preface precludes an argu-
ment that a standing army is necessary to the security of a free
State," does not come instantly to the unaided reader.
If the drafters' goal was to create an individual right to bear
arms, they hardly could improve on the statement that "the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed."75 Conversely, if the goal were to create instead a col-
lective right, no amendment would have been necessary because
existing traditions and the explicit text of the Constitution al-
ready recognized such a right.76 The Framers apparently split
the differences between these opposing positions in drafting the
Second Amendment.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
172. Levinson, supra note 3, at 644.
173. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1236; see also Kates, supra note 38, at 217 (de-
scribing the wording of the Second Amendment as "opaque").
174. See Amar, Constitution, supra note 40, at 1172.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (authorizing Congress "[o provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions").
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Nevertheless, to some, like the National Rifle Association, the
preface bears so little relevance to the right that the preface
might as well have been written in invisible ink.'77 A better
view is that expressed by Reynolds and Van Alstyne, who limit
the preface by arguing that it does not control: "[WIhatever the
meaning of the Amendment's reference to a 'well-regulated mili-
tia,' that reference does not modify the right recognized by the
Amendment."'78 Still, if Reynolds and Van Alstyne's conclusion
is correct, then exactly what does the Second Amendment's pref-
ace do? The assertion that the preface does not modify what fol-
lows may be correct, especially because the preface, lacking a
verb, cannot stand on its own; this is not, however, an unassail-
able reading of the text. No other clause in the Bill of Rights has
its own statement of purpose,'79 and it is reasonable to con-
clude that the stated purpose has something to do with what
follows.
Don Kates, Robert Cottrol, and Raymond Diamond have imag-
inatively overcome the problem of reading the preface as a limi-
tation by arguing instead that it is an amplification. " Thus,
in addition to recognizing the individual right to keep and bear
arms, the preface supports the right to collectively maintain a
militia.'' This conclusion seems to derive from their view that
the text and its history are so clear about the existence of an
individual right that the right must be taken as a given and
therefore the preface, needing some meaning, necessarily be-
177. The language emblazoned on the former NRA Headquarters in Washington,
D.C. is: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." As
one critic pointed out, however, the preamble is "conveniently overlooked." See Paul
K. Vickrey, 2nd Amendment 'Right' is a Myth, CHI. TREB., Apr. 24, 1996, at 14.
178. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 466-67. The quotation in the text, in fact, is
Reynolds summarizing Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1242 (asserting that the "ex-
press guarantee" of the Second Amendment, that people have an individual right to
own guns, cannot be limited by other terms of the Amendment).
179. In contrast, several clauses in the body of the Constitution contain their own
preambles. For example, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, the Copyright and Patent
Clause, aims "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries."
180. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104
YALE L.J. 995, 1001 (1995); Kates, supra note 38, at 217-18.
181. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 180, at 1001; Kates, supra note 38, at 217-18.
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comes an amplification of the individual right.'82 This reason-
ing is a little too circular to persuade anyone but the already
persuaded. Without arguing an amplification theory, Van
Alstyne reached the same result more directly by defining the
textual right as an unconditional one "to keep and bear arms,"
not as the right to join a militia.'83
Other commentators, relying on the same text, have gone sig-
nificantly farther in the other direction. Instead of suggesting
that the preface has something to do with what follows, they
have concluded that the purpose in the preface has everything to
do with what follows. The ensuing right exists only to the extent
that -the preface authorized it." 8 Tribe and Dorf, following
Ely's lead, concluded:
The only purpose it enacted is the one contained in its text,
for only its words are law. And in modern circumstances,
those words most plausibly may be read to preserve a power
of the state militias against abolition by the federal govern-
ment, not the asserted right of individuals to possess all
manner of lethal weapons."
This textual interpretation also can be bolstered by a common
usage English language claim. No one has heard a hunter state
that he is "going to bear arms and shoot ducks."'86
There are two problems with this confident textualism that
guarantees only a collective right via the militia, and thus ex-
182. See Cottroll & Diamond, supra note 180, at 1001-03.
Closer examination of the second clause further supports the individual
rights interpretation. The phrase "to bear arms" is ambiguous. It could
be interpreted either as bearing arms for militia purposes or as bearing
arms for private purposes. An individual right to keep arms, however,
can only be looked upon as a private right ....
Id. at 1002.
183. See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1243-44.
184. See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 127, at 11; ELY, supra note 32, at 94-95.
185. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 127, at 11 (emphasis omitted).
186. It is possible, however, that someone might have said that two centuries ago.
See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis
of the Right to 'Bear Arms", LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 151, 153
(presenting an historical argument that "bearing guns" meant carrying guns as a
hunter would do).
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cludes private possession of guns. The first is Madison's place-
ment of the clause. When Madison introduced the amendments
in Congress, he proposed interlineation with the Constitu-
tion.' Madison's proposed "Second Amendment," along with
his press, speech, and religion guarantees, was to be placed in
the grab bag of Article I, Section 9, after the prohibition against
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws and before the limitation
on direct taxation.' As he initially drafted it, the clause read:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the
best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupu-
lous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military ser-
vice in person.""9
If the collective rights theory were correct, then Madison
should have placed his "Second Amendment" either in Article I
Section 8, with the militia clauses, 9 ' or in Article IV, Section
4, the Guarantee Clause. 9' The conscientious objector provi-
sion does not resolve the problem, for Madison's arms-bearing
clause was split from the religion clauses by the speech and
press clause.'92 Furthermore, Madison's preparatory notes for
his speech about the amendments state: "They relate Ist. to
private rights."193
An even greater problem is the conscious parallelism of "the
right of the people" in the Second Amendment with the identical
language in the First and Fourth Amendments.9 No one ever
has claimed that "the right of the people" "peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government" 5 and "to be secure in
187. See James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 200-03 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) [here-
inafter PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON].
188. See id. at 201.
189. Id.
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 15 & 16.
191. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
192. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 187, at 201.
193. James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress, in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADI-
SON, supra note 187, at 193. His notes contained no "2nd."
194. See Kates, supra note 38, at 218.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects" 96 creates only col-
lective rights, not rights for individuals. To date, I am unaware
of any constitutional scholar, including Tribe and Dorf, who has
attempted to explain why "the right of the people" in the First
and Fourth Amendments is an individual right, but "the right of
the people" in the Second Amendment is not.'97
Garry Wills, however, has taken exactly this position. Wills
has written that "[elvery term in the Second Amendment, taken
singly, has as its first and most obvious meaning a military
meaning."' 98 Wills's argument means "the people," too, must be
interpreted in a military sense, and he is prepared to explain
such an interpretation.'99 The people are the militia and this
"was always the populous armadas, in the corporate sense....
The whole people is the corpus sanum, what Madison calls 'the
people at large'... [that] was often contrasted with the rulers
(senatus populusque).'00
An appropriate response to Wills's Latin exegesis is that "we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing," ' °I and that Wills forgot this principle. Constitutional in-
terpretation must be possible even for those who lack the classi-
cal education of the English aristocrat or his American pre-
tender. Indeed, textual argument depends on this, because it
claims to draw legitimacy from the tacit consent of contemporary
citizens whose acquiescence hardly could be inferred if the text
were recondite.
For those who rely on a purely textual argument to provide an
authoritative interpretation of the Second Amendment, these
anomalies-the Amendment's preface, the conscious parallelism
of its terminology with other amendments, and Madison's in-
tended placement of the Amendment-must be explained coher-
ently. A possible synthesis would be that the citizen has a right
to keep and bear arms, but only to the extent that possessing
weapons makes the citizen available for militia service. Under
196. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
197. See also U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X (referring to "the people").
198. Wills, supra note 30, at 72.
199. See id. at 71.
200. Id.
201. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
1997] 1339
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1311
this construction, an individual could own a military weapon,
but the government could prevent its use for either hunting or
self-defense. This interpretation splits the differences between
the two polar viewpoints and probably would be unsatisfactory
to both."'
Any outside interpreter, coming to the debate with an open
mind, will unlikely be persuaded solely by textual argument.
Other modes of interpretation are necessary for the text of the
Constitution to come alive more than two centuries after its in-
ception. Textual analysis, as the Second Amendment shows, is
best for setting the range of possible solutions. Despite the confi-
dent textualism of Justices Black and Douglas, if textual an-
swers were that clear there would be no litigation on the is-
sue.0 ' Because the Second Amendment's text asks more ques-
tions than it answers, those wishing a fuller interpretation natu-
rally turn elsewhere. Here, again, the divergent interpretations
show. Those whose interpretation favors an individual right turn
to history to find answers to each relevant textual question, and
then assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that the debate is
finished. Those who favor a collective rights interpretation ex-
plicitly assert that the text has been interpreted authoritatively
by the Supreme Court and therefore one need look no further.
C. History
Second Amendment scholars feel most comfortable discussing
history. They claim that the Amendment's history is known and
that it freezes the Amendment's meaning."' To the best of my
202. Individual rights adherents would be dismayed that hunting is barred and
that the use of a gun in self-defense would make the victim the criminal. Collective
rights adherents would know that the existence of guns in private hhnds necessarily
would lead to their use. Both sides would be correct.
203. Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (ex-
plaining that when constitutional provisions are so specific and particularized that
they do not require construction, no questions arise), with Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890) (establishing that the Eleventh Amendment neither says what it
means nor means what it says).
204. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 180, at 999 n.17 ("[Tihe Second
Amendment debate is fundamentally a debate about historical meaning.. .. ");
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary
Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 651 (1995) ("[Analysis of
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knowledge, no First Amendment scholar believes that the First
Amendment's history is dispositive of its meaning.
The First and Second Amendments share the common history
of the adoption of the Constitution, their inclusion in James
Madison's proposed Bill of Rights, and their joint ratifica-
tion.0 5 When the Antifederalists read the work of the Philadel-
phia Convention, they saw too much centralized power built on
broad grants of authority: the taxing power, the power to raise
an army, and the elastic "necessary and proper" clause. The
Antifederalists wanted to block the Constitution's adoption, and
the best political route was its failure to include a bill of
rights.20
6
The Federalists, especially Alexander Hamilton, saw the
Antifederalist argument for what it was: a deal breaker. °7
Others, including Madison, eventually and reluctantly came to
believe that a bill of rights was not inconsistent with the premis-
es of the Constitution and indeed might improve it. 2°5 As
Speaker of the House, Madison thus introduced and shepherded
the Bill of Rights through the legislative process.2 9 But the de-
bates were not extensive in the House, unrecorded in the Sen-
ate, and sparse again in the States. 10 Interpreting the mean-
ing of the provisions necessarily means going outside of their
legislative history, with one primary exception. The purpose of
the Bill of Rights was to limit what the federal government
the Framers' original intent] has come to dominate Second Amendment discussion.").
205. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 187, at 201; Paul Finkelman,
James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
301, 301-02.
206. See generally Finkelman, supra note 205, at 314 (stating that the proposed
Constitution's lack of a bill of rights raised the most Antifederalist complaints).
207. See generally id. at 320 (mentioning that most Federalists did not take seri-
ously their opponents' demands for a bill of rights).
208. See id. at 337 describing the reasons for which Madison eventually was con-
vinced that a bill of rights had to be added to the Constitution); see also JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 330-36 (1996) (discussing Madison's involvement in cre-
ating the Bill of Rights).
209. See Finkelman, supra note 205.
210. See generally id. at 341-43 (addressing progress of the constitutional amend-
ments in the legislature).
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could do.21' Any interpretation of a provision of the Bill of
Rights as a grant of federal power is ipso facto wrong.212
The relevant history of the First Amendment was essentially
the history following Parliament's abolition of licensing of publi-
cations in 1694-1695 and the subsequent seditious libel prosecu-
tions from Zenger onward.21 Because of William Blackstone's
Commentaries and the end of licensing, it generally was accept-
ed that the First Amendment barred prior restraints; seditious
libel was the contested ground, and the debate was waged on
both sides of the Atlantic."4 The relevant history of the Second
Amendment, by contrast, seems trapped in England prior to the
Glorious Revolution and then modestly supplemented in North
America by the rhetoric and fears surrounding the Constitution's
ratification.215
The historical debate on the First Amendment can be framed
succinctly. The central question is whether the Framers, when
they guaranteed freedom of the press, intended to go beyond the
scope of Blackstone's Commentaries, which defined the freedom
as "laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published."" 6
Leonard Levy's influential work answered the question negative-
ly and argued that Blackstone represents the entirety of the law
because, with a single aberrant exception that produced no fol-
lowing, no one claimed that seditious libel was included in guar-
211. See RAKOVE, supra note 208, at 333.
212. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784-87 (1987)
(arguing that the First Amendment grants the state power to regulate speech in or-
der to enhance public discourse), with L.A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 182-84 (1987) (criticizing Fiss for using a limitation on
government action to justify government regulation).
213. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 8-10 (1985) (ex-
plaining the use of seditious libel prosecution as a method of controlling the press
[hereinafter LEVY, FREE PRESS]; LEVY, supra note 73, at 8-11 (discussing the end of
licensing as well as the operation of libel principle).
214. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at 10-15.
215. See generally Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An
Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975)
(discussing the history of the Second Amendment from feudal England to the mod-
em day), reprinted in Cottrol, supra note 35, at 185.
216. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151-52.
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anteed free speech.21 Most other scholars have disagreed with
Levy, arguing that he asked the wrong question and therefore
ignored the meaning of his own excellent research.1 "
Levy's is a tight, historical thesis. If the First Amendment
were repudiating Blackstone, surely there would be more evi-
dence than the writing of an isolated author, questioning sedi-
tious libel, but not all libel.219 Levy claims that there is no oth-
er evidence.2
The civic republican ideology of the English Country Whigs
found fertile ground in North America, and works like John
Trenchard- and Thomas Gordon's Cato's Letters were read wide-
ly, reprinted, and quoted.22" ' Americans agreed with Trenchard
and Gordon that freedom of the press was one of the "great Bul-
wark[s] of Liberty,"222 and Americans supported this principle
in their state constitutions.2 ' Nevertheless, although
Trenchard and Gordon were skeptical about British uses of sedi-
tious libel, they never suggested its abolition; 2 nor did the
great American innovation in Zenger.225 Only when the Sedi-
tion Act crisis arose at the end of the century did a handful of
prominent Jeffersonians, from Albert Gallatin and Madison in
217. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at 197, 208-09.
218. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 455 (1983); POWE, supra note 105, at 25-50; David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical
Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37
STAN. L. REv. 795 (1985); Dwight L. Teeter, Press Freedom and the Public Printing.
Pennsylvania, 1775-83, 45 JOURNALISM Q. 445 (1968); Dwight L. Teeter, The Printer
and the Chief Justice: Seditious Libel in 1782-83, 45 JOURNALISM Q. 235 (1968);
Dwight L. Teeter, A Legacy of Expression: Philadelphia Newspapers and Congress
During the War for Independence, 1775-1783, (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin).
219. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at 208-09 (noting that the isolated au-
thor was Junius Wilkes).
220. See id. at 209 (asserting that Junius Wilkes "engendered no progeny"). The
correspondence between John Adams and William Cushing in 1789, however, can
and should be read to indicate that both men had moved beyond Blackstone in their
conception of freedom of the press. See id. at 198-200.
221. See id. at 109-118.
222. Id. at 110 (quoting Cato's Letters).
223. Cf id. at 113-14 (asserting that Cato's Letters was the most influential 18th
century work on freedom of the press).
224. See id. at 111-13.
225. See id. at 119.
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the political arena to St. George Tucker in writing the first
American edition of Blackstone, claim that the First Amendment
had transformed the common law."' That claim, according to
Levy, arose circumstantially and did not reflect American think-
ing of a decade earlier.227
Levy noted that American printers during the Revolution act-
ed as though the doctrine of seditious libel did not exist; there
was "nearly [an] epidemic degree of seditious libel."228 Levy
found it mysterious "[tlhat so many courageous and irresponsi-
ble editors daily risked imprisonment [after 1776]. " 29 Seditious
libel, as Levy and others have documented, was rampant,
though prosecutions for it were rare.23 Levy's thesis precludes
his believing that those in the trenches may have best under-
stood what the law in action really was. The printers perhaps
understood that the celebrations of the importance of freedom of
the press meant that they had the freedom to write as they
pleased.
After declaring independence from England, twelve states"'
drafted new constitutions, and ten of those included freedom of
the press in their declarations of rights.3 2 A majority of states
proposing amendments to the federal constitution wanted free-
dom of the press added.233 As David Anderson concluded, "[t]he
revolutionary state constitutions, the ratifying conventions, and
the First Congress produced numerous expressions [that] leave
little doubt that press freedom was viewed as being closely relat-
ed to the experiment of representative self-government."2"4 Yet
Levy suggested initially that all of this originated from a desire
to prevent prior restraints." 5 That is an unlikely reality for
226. Cf. id. at 297-304.
227. Cf id. at 297 (explaining how passage of the Sedition Act brought out the lib-
ertarianism in Americans).
228. Id. at x.
229. Id. at xvi.
230. See id. at 144-45.
231. References to the states involve 14 total states-the 13 original states and
Vermont. Cf id. at 183.
232. See id. at 191.
233. See BERNARD ScHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 157 (1992).
234. Anderson, supra note 218, at 533.
235. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at xi-xii. In this book, Levy sought to
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two reasons. First, the rhetoric is disproportionate to such a
narrow problem. Second, prior restraints were an English prob-
lem; they had not been an issue in America. Is it reasonable to
assume that Americans were so passionate about settling a
century-old English debate that had not affected them?
To be sure, in expressing the importance of liberty of the
press, Americans did not define its scope and, with a single ex-
ception, did not claim that it repudiated BlackstoneY6
Blackstone's conception of freedom of the press was one of limit-
ing the monarch in a system where parliament was now
sovereignY When the Sedition Act crisis came to the fore,
Gallatin, Madison, and Tucker had no difficulty articulating that
Blackstone's conception of sovereignty did not apply in America
because sovereignty rested in the people, not the government,
and that fact precluded the people's agents from limiting the
people's debate.2"
The debate over whether the First Amendment had a broader
scope than that conceived of by Blackstone is a perfect historical
debate. Only accuracy, not law, turns on its outcome. The Su-
preme Court cemented its individualist First Amendment juris-
prudence in the decade following publication of Levy's original
book. 9 Indeed, the Court's opinion in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan resurrected the Sedition Act 163 years after its statuto-
ry death in order to slay it properly; the historical debate over
correct some of the misleading impressions he left with his earlier book, Legacy of
Suppression, supra note 73. Levy clarified his position by explaining that although
freedom of the press may begin with its immunity from prior restraints, it is not
necessarily this limited. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at xi.
236. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at 208-09 (describing the writings of
"Junius Wilkes," pen name of the first writer who explicitly "rejected [Blackstone's] prin-
ciple of subsequent punishment [and] the standard of falsity as a test of criminality").
237. See id. at 316.
238. See id. at 316-17 (presenting Madison's analysis of the differences between
British and American governments, and the consequences of those differences on the
freedoms enjoyed by the press).
239. LEVY, supra note 73. The Court's actions thereby put the lie to Justice Black's
fear "I hope you are right but I am afraid you are not in believing that Dean
Levy's book has done no damage to the First Amendment." Leonard W. Levy,
Anecdotage, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 1, 3 (1996) (quoting Justice Hugo Black).
Note that Levy himself revised his views in the time between publishing Legacy
of Suppression and Emergence of a Free Press. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note
213, at vii.
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the First Amendment during this period did not influence the
Court a whit." °
If Levy's initial theory that First Amendment protection was
limited to preventing prior restraints was correct, then the
Court's decisions cannot be squared with the Framers' views. If
those who dissent from Levy's original thesis are correct, then
historical justifications for broadly interpreting the First Amend-
ment are fully available. In neither case, however, does history
set the scope of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court's free
expression jurisprudence rests on notions of individual liberty
that gained prominence in the mid-twentieth century, strongly
reinforced by its reading of our traditions. History offers a pow-
erful rhetorical connection between the abuses of the past and
those of the present. This is not originalism, however, for no one
claims that without the examples from the Colonial Era to serve
as modern reference points, the decisions of the present would
be different.
With respect to the Second Amendment, however, the Stan-
dard Model claims that by adopting originalism the outcomes of
the few relevant decisions would differ. Because the United
States has not habitually disarmed citizens, the connection be-
tween the past and present in the Second Amendment is more
attenuated than it has been in First Amendment opinions. Nev-
ertheless, that past can inform the present.
The right to bear arms was not one of the ancient rights of
Englishmen; it was a product of the tumultuous events from the
English Civil War to the Glorious Revolution."' During the In-
terregnum, Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army made sporadic
efforts to disarm Royalist and Catholic opponents of the re-
gime." With the Restoration, the British continued their fear
of religious warfare and Catholicism, but also acquired "a rooted
aversion to standing armies and an abiding dread of military
rule."2A3
240. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964).
241. See MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 9 ("No claim was made for a right for Eng-
lishmen to be armed either in Magna Carta or in subsequent listings of English lib-
erties before 1689.').
242. See id. at 22-28.
243. Id. at 30 (quoting C.H. FIRTH, CROMWE'IS ARMY 381 (4th ed. 1962)).
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King Charles II governed a country that, because of the Civil
War, was well armed and contained numerous potential ene-
mies.' He successfully created a "select militia" as a political-
ly reliable voluntary army, gave it extensive training, and selec-
tively disarmed those whom he distrusted.245 The principal le-
gal justification was the Game Act of 1671.6 This Act aban-
doned the need to prove that guns or bows had been used ille-
gally to hunt and instead simply listed them as prohibited weap-
ons, essentially turning all but the gentry into potential crimi-
nals. 7 Although the law made possession of weapons illegal
for most people, it was "enforced with a decided ambiva-
lence.""5 Whatever Charles II had done, James II did more
vigorously, and the latter's attempts to enforce disarmament
through the Game Act resulted in stricter enforcement against
Protestants, while simultaneously leaving Catholics armed. 9
The Glorious Revolution swept away James II and his policy
of disarming ProtestantsY5 0 Included in the British Declaration
of Rights is a recognition that at least some Protestants have
the right to bear arms: "That the Subjects which are Protestants
may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions,
and as allowed by Law." 5' The lessons of the Civil War were
reinf6rced: An unpopular government would attempt to achieve
a monopoly on weapons and, if successful, such a monopoly
would have untoward consequences only for those viewed as op-
ponents of the regime.
Yet less than a decade later, after the Treaty of Ryswick, Wil-
liam III made clear that he wished to maintain a large standing
244. See id. at 31-33.
245. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 180, at 1009.
246. 22 & 23 Car. II, ch. 25 (1671).
247. See MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 69-76. The property qualifications to hunt,
and therefore to legally own a gun, were 50 times greater than those needed for eli-
gibility to vote. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 216, at *175.
248. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 180, at 1009.
249. See id. at 1009-10.
250. See id. at 1010.
251. 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689), quoted in Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of
the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 285, 307 (1983).
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army.252 This launched John Trenchard on his successful ca-
reer as a pamphleteer.25 Like James Harrington's Oceana'
during the Interregnum, Trenchard's civic republicanism saw an
active and vital citizenry as essential to the preservation of
liberty."' Trenchard claimed that the reason Englishmen alone
remained free was that they relied on the citizen militia rather
than a standing army:
And if we enquire how these unhappy nations have lost that
precious jewel Liberty, and we as yet preserved it, we shall
find their miseries and our happiness proceed from this, that
their necessities or indiscretion have permitted a standing
army to be kept amongst them, and our situation rather than
our prudence, hath as yet defended us from it."s
Like liberty of the press, a citizen militia, not a "select militia,"
was essential to the preservation of freedom."s
The colonists devoured the republican ideology of the Country
Whigs,258 but hardly needed it to justify a militia any more
than they needed Blackstone to know that they could be
armed.259 In the decade after the French and Indian War, colo-
nists also did not need to be reminded that, as Englishmen, they
did not like Thomas Gage's Redcoats,26 although the Decla-
252. See MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 124.
253. See id. at 125.
254. JAMES HARRINGTON, COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656).
255. See MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 125.
256. Id. at 125 (quoting JOHN TRENCHARD, AN ARGUMENT SHEWING THAT A STAND-
ING ARMY IS INCONSISTENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT, AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUC-
TIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH MONARCHY 114-15 (1697)).
257. See id. ("There were dangers in a militia of propertyless men and in a 'select
militia' whose members were chosen for their political or religious affiliations.
Trenchard recommended that the militia 'consist of the same persons as have the
property'.").
258. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 34-54 (1967) (discussing the influence of Country Whig writers in the
colonies).
259. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 216, at *143 (discussing "the fifth and last aux-
iliary right," that of owning weapons for one's defense).
260. Cf. JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW 5-6 (1981) (quoting a 1770
resolution of the Massachusetts House of Representatives: "A military Force . . . if
posted among the People, without their express Consent, is itself, one of the greatest
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ration of Independence proclaimed exactly that.2"' The untamed
conditions of North America made local militias essential, and
negated any need for restrictive game laws. Blackstone stated
that bearing arms served "to protect and maintain inviolate the
three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property."282 Virtually all adult free white
males in the colonies were required to be in the militia and to
provide their own arms;" s in some isolated areas the law even
required a person to be armed whenever he was away from his
home."'
Bernard Bailyn has detailed the colonists' embrace of the
Country Whigs' civic republican ideology, for whom Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon were successful advocates on the western
side of the Atlantic."' Edmund Morgan's recent summary of
militia ideology, although more succinct, is remarkably similar
to Trenchard's.266 "[Tihese independent yeomen, armed and
embodied in a militia, are also a popular government's best
protection against its enemies, whether they be aggressive for-
Grievances, and threatens the total subversion of a free Constitution").
261. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) ("[The King of Great
Britain] has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies [and ships of war],
without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military inde-
pendent of, and superior to the civil power."), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 251, 252-53 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY].
262. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 216, at 141.
263. See Kates, supra note 38, at 214-15.
With slight variations, the different colonies imposed a duty to keep arms
and to muster occasionally for drill upon virtually every able-bodied white
man between the age of majority and a designated cut-off age. Moreover,
the duty to keep arms applied to every household, not just to those con-
taining persons subject to militia service.
Id. at 215; see also infra note 337 (noting the citizen soldier's obligation to arm himself).
264. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 143, at 139 (listing mid-17th century Virginia
and Newport, Rhode Island, as other areas where one was required to be armed at
all times); Kates, supra note 38, at 215-16 (discussing a 1770 Georgia law that re-
quired all men to carry a gun every time they attended church and authorized
church officials to search parishioners up to 14 times a year in order to monitor
their compliance).
265. See BAILYN, supra note 258, at 34-54. No discussion of the First Amendment's
origins would fail to mention Cato's Letters, by Trenchard and Gordon. See supra
text accompanying notes 221-24.
266. See EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 156-57 (1988).
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eign monarchs or scheming demagogues within the nation it-
self.
,267
Revolutionary constitutions spoke to Second Amendment con-
cerns, especially the importance of a militia, but not with the
consistency or clarity with which the constitutions addressed
freedom of the press. Recall that ten of the twelve states that
drafted new constitutions included a declaration of rights pro-
tecting freedom of the press.2 6' By contrast, only eight states
dealt with any aspect of the Second Amendment, and here there
was considerable linguistic and possibly substantive diversi-
ty.269 It is worth noting that only two mentioned freedom of
speech.
273 the21Delaware,27' Maryland,7 2  and Virginia praised the
militia as the natural defense of a free state, while they simulta-
neously condemned a standing army as a threat to liberty. New
Hampshire 274  and Massachusetts2 75  agreed with this logic,
but also added that free men have a right of "enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty."2 76 Massachusetts also specifically re-
ferred to "a right to keep and to bear arms" in the context of
"common defence."2 7  A similar provision, granting people a
267. Id. at 156.
268. References to the states involve 14 total states, including the 13 original
states and Vermont. Two of these 14, Connecticut and Rhode Island, retained their
Colonial charters rather than drafting new constitutions; New York and New Jersey
did not develop declarations of rights. Malcolm erroneously lumped Georgia and
South Carolina in the group of states without declarations of rights. See MALCOLM,
supra note 143, at 149. These states, however, protected rights that they deemed to
be fundamental in the body of their constitutions.
269. See id. at 146-50.
270. These states were Pennsylvania and Vermont. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 233, at 87.
271. See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 18, 19 (1776), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 276, 278.
272. See MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ XXV, XXVI (1776), reprinted in 1 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 280, 282.
273. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 261, at 234, 235.
274. See N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS §§ XXIV, XXV (1783), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 261, at 375, 378.
275. See MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVII (1780), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTA-
RY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 339, 342-43.
276. N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS § 11 (1783), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 261, at 357; see also MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § I (1780), reprinted in, 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 339, 340.
277. MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVII (1780), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
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right to bear arms for the "defence of the State," appears in the
North Carolina constitution.
After the typical condemnation of standing armies, the highly
democratic constitution of Pennsylvania declared: "the people
have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
state."279 Vermont, a year later, largely copied Pennsylvania's
declaration of rights.80 Pennsylvania and Vermont were also
the only two states that expressly protected freedom of
speech.28' The remaining two states, Georgia and South Caroli-
na, were silent on the militia and arms although they both had
press clauses. 82
The proposed Federal Constitution was anything but silent on
military issues; it gave numerous military powers to Congress.
Article I explicitly gave Congress the powers (1) to "raise and
support armies," (2) to "provide and maintain a navy," and (3) to
"make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces."' The document then turned to the militia and
authorized Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining" a militia, and to "provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union [and] suppress insurrec-
tions.'"2' The reasons for granting Congress the power to main-
tain an army were expressed in a letter written by Gouverneur
Morris.2' For all the rhetoric about militias as an essential
element of freedom, they were ineffective fighting forces during
HISTORY, supra note 261, at 339, 342.
278. See N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVII (1776), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 261, at 286, 287.
279. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII (1776), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY, supra note 261, at 263, 266.
280. See VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XV (1777), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 261, at 319, 324.
281. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 233, at 87.
282. See generally GA. CONST. (1777), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 261, at 291; S.C. CONST. (1778), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 261, at 325.
283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
284. Id. cls. 15, 16.
285. See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent (Jan. 12, 1815), reprinted in
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 420 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
("Those, who, during the Revolutionary storm, had confidential acquaintance with the
conduct of affairs, knew well that to rely on militia was to lean on a broken reed.")
[hereinafter Morris Letter].
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Revolution.286 The Constitutional Convention yielded to ne-
cessity rather than ideology and authorized a standing army. 7
The Constitution's ratification would have meant that the bat-
tle over control of military force, and the ability of the national
government to take action against rebellions and insurrections,
had been won decisively by the national government. The
Antifederalists understood this all too well. The military provi-
sions frightened the Antifederalists, probably more than did any
other part of the nationalizing Constitution.
In The Federalist No. 46, Madison tried to calm
Antifederalists' fears by "disprov[ing] the reality" of what he
claimed was "the visionary supposition that the Federal Govern-
ment may previously accumulate a military force for the projects
of ambition.""5 After focusing on how unlikely it was that the
people would "silently and patiently" wait, he turned to the prac-
tical military issue, to show that "State Governments with the
people on their side would be able to repel the danger."289 A
standing army's size inherently is limited and the state militias
therefore could defeat it. 9' Madison then contrasted America
with Europe where, despite large standing armies, "the govern-
ments are afraid to trust the people with arms."29' If Europe-
ans, those "debased subjects of arbitrary power," had the advan-
tages of Americans, they, too, would be free.2 Madison conclud-
ed, "Let us... no longer insult" Americans by suggesting that
they might be tamed into submission. 3 If the federal govern-
ment were to lack "the confidence of the people, [then] its
286. See MORGAN, supra note 266, at 160-65 (noting the contrast between the ide-
ology of the militia and its ineffectiveness).
287. See generally Morris Letter, supra note 285, at 421 ("[T]o rely on undisciplined,
ill-officered men, though each were individually as brave as Caesar, to resist the well-
directed impulse of veterans, is to act in defiance of reason and experience.").
288. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
289. Id. at 299.
290. See id. Here, as a propagandist, Madison ignored the Convention's conclusion
that militias were ineffective. See id. Indeed, he cited their success in the Revolu-
tionary War. See id.
291. Id.




schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State gov-
ernments, who will be supported by the people."29
Madison, like everyone else, pro or con, equated the militia
with "the people." At the Virginia ratifying convention, George
Mason, who had refused to sign the proposed Constitution in
Philadelphia, partially because it lacked a declaration of
rights,"' asked rhetorically, "Who are the militia?" and then
answered, "They consist now of the whole people... .296 His
fear was that if "that paper on the table" were not amended, the
militia might not be so inclusive in the future. 7 It was impor-
tant to the preservation of liberty that the true militia, rather
than the "select militia," be available. Thus the Federal Farm-
er,29" attacking the Constitution, tied together the preservation
of liberty and the wide distribution of arms: "[Tbo preserve liber-
ty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always pos-
sess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to
use them."299
The Federalists were honorable men, so the Antifederalists
did not have to take up arms against the newly created central
government.9 ' Because the Federalists were both honorable
and sagacious men, amendments to the Constitution were forth-
coming. Seven states proposed some amendment of the Constitu-
tion."0' South Carolina desired an amendment reserving rights
294. Id.
295. See Finkelman, supra note 205, at 305-06.
296. The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 14, 1788) (statement of George Mason),
reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1836).
297. See id. at 425-26.
298. Although the Letters from the Federal Farmer were written by an anonymous
Antifederalist, scholars now believe that the author was actually Melancton Smith.
See RAKOVE, supra note 208, at 228-29.
299. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 124 (Walter
Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) (No. XVII, Jan. 25, 1788).
300. But see infra text accompanying notes 600-02 (discussing the Whiskey Rebellion).
301. See SCMVARTZ, supra note 233, at 158. This total includes Massachusetts,
Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.
See id. It excludes Pennsylvania, a state that discussed but did not propose
amendments, see id. at 123, and does not recognize the Maryland minority amend-
ments. See generally id. at 130 (distinguishing between the Maryland majority and
minority amendments). Schwartz included both Pennsylvania and the Maryland mi-
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to the states,"2 while Massachusetts wanted reserved states'
rights and a guarantee of civil juries.03 All other states re-
quested those guarantees, as well as numerous others. Four
states wanted a right to bear arms. Virginia, New York, and
North Carolina proposed that the people should have a right to
keep and bear arms.0 4 New Hampshire demanded that "Con-
gress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have
been in Actual Rebellion." °5 In comparison, four states also
wished to guarantee freedom of the press,3°' but only three
would have guaranteed freedom of speech.0 7
Ten days after Madison introduced the Bill of Rights,"'
Tench Coxe °9 published a defense of Madison's proposals:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly be-
fore them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military
forces which must be occasionally raised to defend our
country, might pervert their power to the injury of their fel-
low citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in
their right to keep and bear their private arms.31
nority in his totals. See id. at 158.
The amendments proposed to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention included
free press, free speech, and arms clauses. See id. at 123-25. A majority of the dele-
gates at the Maryland Ratifying Convention accepted a free press amendment, but
neither the majority nor the minority included an arms clause. See id. at 130-33.
302. See id. at 133.
303. See id. at 128-29.
304. See Va. Ratifying Convention (June 27, 1788) ("[The people have a right to
keep and bear arms . . . ."), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261,
at 762, 842; N.Y. Proposed Amendments (1788) ("[Tihe People have a right to keep
and bear Arms . . . ."), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at
911, 912; N.C. Convention Debates (Aug. 1, 1788) ("[Ihe people have a right to keep
and bear arms .... "), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at
933, 968.
305. N.H. Proposed Amendments (1788), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 261, at 760, 761.
306. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 233, at 157. These four states were Maryland, New
York, North Carolina, and Virginia. See id.
307. See id. These three states were North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See id.
308. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's proposed
arms clause).
309. Over the years Coxe was occasionally an ally of Madison. See Douglas R.
Egerton, Coxe, Tench, in JAMES MADISON AND THE AMERICAN NATION 1751-1836: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 102 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1994).
310. A Pennsylvanian [Tench Coxe], Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to
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Coxe forwarded a copy to Madison,"' who replied immediately,
commending Coxe's efforts.312
Madison's proposals were sent to the House acting as a Com-
mittee of the Whole,313 and the future Second Amendment
emerged still looking awkward. "Country" became "state" and
the references to the militia and the right to bear arms were
reversed: "A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no per-
son religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms."31 4
The final form of the amendment was the Senate's. 15 As it did
with the future First Amendment, the Senate made the lan-
guage more economical by dropping the definition of militia,16
changing "best security" to "necessary" and dropping the consci-
entious objection clause. 17
What did the Framers intend? Although the record is some-
what ambiguous, the Standard Model individual rights theory
has far more to support it than does the collective rights theory
the Federal Constitution, PHILA FED. GAZETTE, June 18, 1789, at 2, quoted in Kates,
supra note 38, at 224. Within three weeks of its initial publication, New York and
Boston newspapers had reprinted Coxe's essay. See Kates, supra note 38, at 224 n.81.
311. See Letter from Teach Coxe to James Madison (June 18, 1789), in 12 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 187, at 239, 241 n.1.
312. See Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 12 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 187, at 257 ("How far the experiment [of amend-
ments] may succeed in any of these respects is wholly uncertain. It will however be
greatly favored by explanatory strictures of a healing tendency, and is therefore al-
ready indebted to the co-operation of your pen.").
313. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 1009.
314. Id. at 1107.
315. See id. at 1159.
316. Given the widely understood distinction between a militia of the people and a
"select" militia, as illustrated by George Mason's rhetorical query, see supra text ac-
companying note 296, linguistic economy seems to be the reason for the change. A
definition of "militia" was unnecessary when everyone agreed about its meaning. I
am unaware of anyone, even Garry Wills, who has suggested that dropping the defi-
nition caused "militia" to be redefined. See generally infra text accompanying notes
340-67 (discussing Garry Wills).
317. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 1164. In its final form, the
amendment read: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Id.
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that necessarily negates an individual right. The Second Amend-
ment was a reaction against the military clauses of Article I of
the Constitution and a recognition of how deeply Americans felt
about an armed citizenry that could defend its rights and liber-
ties as it had so recently in the Revolutionary War.
The only historians who have refuted the individual rights
theory, albeit from very different viewpoints, are Lawrence
Delbert Cress and Garry Wills. Cress wrote that the history of
the Second Amendment demonstrates civic republicanism, pure
and simple: public virtue with its emphasis on the character
and the duties of the citizen.318 Civic republicanism, by defini-
tion, excludes the possibility of an individual right.319 Wills
wrote that the same history surrounding the adoption of the
Second Amendment confirms his linguistic analysis that, in con-
text, the amendment means nothing; Madison just snookered
everyone.
320
Cress began with the irrefutable conclusion that the citizen
militia traces its lineage directly back to civic republican
ideology. 2 He also ended with this premise, concluding that
every statement about arms must be interpreted in light of this
corporate view of society.3 22 Cress took the statements of civic
republicanism very seriously. Because republicanism is corpo-
rate and hierarchical, rather than individual and egalitarian,
Cress viewed the militia as "reinforc[ing] the deferential social
and political relationships that ensured order and a respect for
318. See Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of
the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 23-24 (1984) ("In the eighteenth century,
citizenship, which was defined in part by militia service, connoted civic virtue, a com-
mitment to the greater public good, not an insistence on individual prerogative.").
319. Two other scholars, who wrote of the amendment and its tight relation to civ-
ic republicanism, nevertheless concluded that it embraces an individual right. See
Levinson, supra note 3; David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Mi-
litia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
320. See Wills, supra note 30, at 72 (stating that Madison proposed the Second
Amendment to "win acceptance of the new government" among its critics).
321. See Cress, supra note 318, at 22 ("[Tlhe people of the United States incorporated
the essence of [Machiavelli's] ideas into the language of the Second Amendment.").
322. See id. at 24 ("[Sleventeenth- and eighteenth-century republican theorists un-
derstood access to arms to be a communal, rather than individual, right.").
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authority throughout society."323 Citizenship entailed duties,
not prerogatives, and one of those duties was militia service."4
The problems with Cress's approach are twofold. First, his
position rests on the conclusion that the civic republicanism of
England remained unchanged in the dramatically different set-
ting of Colonial America, where hunting game was not a prob-
lem and Indians occasionally were. I concede that this premise
may be correct.32 5 Second, significant contrary evidence sug-
gests that more than republicanism is at work. Cress believed
such statements are not entitled to credit because they are
"clearly out of touch" with prevailing ideology.326 Yet that as-
sertion implicitly requires Cress to place Thomas Jefferson out
of touch with his times, a conclusion that is not possible. 7
Jefferson's initial proposed Virginia constitution did not even
mention the militia, but it did guarantee that "no freeman shall
ever be debarred the use of arms."2' Years later Jefferson
wrote to George Washington, in language that sounds like the
323. Id. at 29.
324. See id. at 23-24.
325. Cf. BAILYN, supra note 258, at 43 ("To say simply that this tradition of opposition
thought was quickly transmitted to America and widely appreciated there is to under-
state the fact. Opposition thought, in the form it acquired at the turn of the seventeenth
century and in the early eighteenth century, was devoured by the colonists.").
Note that Bailyn's statement does not claim that North American conditions did
not change some of the meanings of civic republican. To be accurate, Cress's position
still requires that changed conditions did not change actual meaning.
326. See Lawrence Delbert Cress, The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear
Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587, 593 (1984). Cress stated that he "cited
several examples [of individual rights theory] myself" in his initial article. See id. In
that article, however, he attempted to shape examples contrary to his republican
theory into seeming republican. For example, Cress stated that "[tihe principles
evoked by those resolutions [allowing arms for killing game and forbidding taking
arms from citizens] were, however, much more akin to the classical republican un-
derstanding of the armed citizenry than appears at first glance." Cress, supra note
318, at 34.
327. Jefferson was in France and marginal to the Constitution's framing. See WILLARD
STERNE RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 427, 493 (1993) (noting that Thomas Jef-
ferson moved to Paris in mid-1786 and returned to the United States on November 23,
1789). On the other hand, he hardly was out of touch with the prevalent ideology of the
times and this is the conclusion that Cress's argument requires.
328. First Draft by Jefferson of the Va. Const., in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 337, 344 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950) [hereinafter PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON].
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words of an NRA executive, "one loves to possess arms."329 Jef-
ferson believed that guns were important to an individual's inde-
pendence and character. He advised his nephew that "[glames
played with the ball and others of that nature, are too violent for
the body and stamp no character on the mind."30 Instead, Jef-
ferson stated, "I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate
exercise to the body, it gives boldness, enterprize, and
independance to the mind" and should be "the constant compan-
ion of your walks."33' Jefferson's advice flows directly out of re-
publicanism, but his proposed guarantee is purely in terms of an
individual right.
Cress wished "to place citizenship, especially the idea of citi-
zens in arms, in a context compatible with the republican theory
of revolutionary America."332 This demands a literal and mono-
lithic ideology of civic republicanism, one that even Cress ac-
knowledged "may have been anachronistic in 1789."3 3 Why,
then, should the Framers be expected to comply with an anach-
ronism? "Common sense [holds] that a society that was unwill-
ing to allow all adult males to vote would not embrace a consti-
tutional principle ensuring their right to own firearms." 34 In
1775, however, General Thomas Gage ordered citizens of Boston
to turn in their arms, and many complied.3 5 Commenting in
this incident, the Continental Congress declared, "They accord-
ingly delivered up their Arms, but in open violation of
Honour... ,,331 The society that Cress describes already re-
quired those nonvoting adult males to own firearms for their
militia service.3 7 One may speculate as to how the citizens
329. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (June 19, 1796), in 9
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 339, 341 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
330. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, in 8 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 328, at 405, 407.
331. Id.
332. Cress, supra note 318, at 23.
333. Cress, supra note 326, at 593.
334. Id.
335. See Halbrook, supra note 186, at 151 (stating that the citizens turned in 1778
muskets, 634 pistols, 973 bayonets, and 38 blunderbusses).
336. Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (July 6, 1775) re-
printed in 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 328, at 213.
337. "America's strength rested in 'making every citizen a soldier, and every soldier
a citizen; not only permitting every man to arm, but obliging him to arm'." Robert
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might have reacted to a similar proclamation to disarm coming
from General Alexander Hamilton in February 1801.38
One would anticipate that the citizens would not have reacted
positively to such a demand. The answer to this hypothetical
becomes more clear if the First Amendment scholars have
framed a correct theory of sovereignty. If there had been a shift
from a Blackstonian conception to a belief in sovereignty of the
people,39 then it seems inconceivable that the people would
have turned over their arms after ratifying the Second Amend-
ment.
Wills believes the history of the Second Amendment supports
his linguistic exegesis of its text so that the truly informed read-
er will understand that, in context, the Amendment adds noth-
ing to the Constitution 4 In 1789, when the Bill of Rights first
was introduced, 4' Congress could create a standing army as
well as organize and regulate militias. 2 Congress still had
these powers in 1792, after the amendments to the Constitution
were ratified."3 According to Wills, there is no individual right
to possess arms in the Constitution and the Second Amendment
did not grant such a right. What the Second Amendment pro-
vides is what the Constitution provided already: a right to bear
arms in a well-regulated militia.3"
E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1986, at 125, 131 (quoting J. BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN
THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE: RESULTING FROM THE NECESSITY AND PROPRIETY
OF A GENERAL REVOLUTION IN THE PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNMENT, PARTS I AND II, at
16 (1792)).
338. The Governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania were ready to call out the militia
if the Federalists in Congress usurped the election of 1800 and blocked the selection
of Thomas Jefferson or Aaron Burr as president. See 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON
THE PREsmENT. FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 7-11 (1970).
339. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 404-05 (1819) ("The gov-
ernment of the Union ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In
form, and in substance, it emirates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and
are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.").
340. See Wills, supra note 30, at 72.
341. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 1006.
342. See U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 15, 16.
343. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 1171; see also Wills, supra
note 30, at 72 (explaining that the passage of the Second Amendment did not affect
Congress's powers to establish a standing army or organize a militia).
344. See Wills, supra note 30, at 72.
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Wills derided the historical claims for an individual right by
making two points on how to assess the relevant history. First,
he claimed that much of the evidence offered by the Standard
Model advocates is distorted and false. 5 Second, he asserted
that statements about arms and standing armies made during
the ratification debates do not count as evidence because they
were aimed at the military clauses in the proposed Constitution,
not at the Second Amendment.34
As to Wills's first point, I do not pretend to be a Second
Amendment historian, 347 but I am deeply skeptical of a blanket
and unsupported claim that all other scholars are mistaken. 46
Wills's second point is absurd on its face. If statements made
about standing armies, militias, and arms in the aftermath of
the Glorious Revolution count as evidence349 then, a fortiori,
statements made a century later also count. If our only evidence
about the provisions of the Bill of Rights is limited to what was
said after ratification of the Constitution and before ratification
of the Amendments three years later, then we indeed have an
impoverished record.
Wills's conclusion that the Second Amendment adds nothing
to the Constitution seems so stark even to himself that he asks,
"[wlhy, then, did Madison propose the Second Amendment?"350
This question is especially baffling if Wills is correct and the
Amendment "had no real meaning."351 The answer, Wills con-
cluded, is that Madison snookered the Antifederalist opposi-
tion.352 The Second and Third Amendments 35 3 were simply
345. See id. at 64-65.
346. See id. at 70.
347. My critique of Cress and Wills is based on my independent evaluation of their
claims as historical arguments in the context of America in the last quarter of the
18th century.
348. Wills may have behaved more like an advocate and less like an historian
when reading the historical record. That may be the reason he did not mention fig-
ures such as Tench Coxe.
349. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 143 (discussing the interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment in light of English influences from the Middle Ages onward); Kates,
supra note 38, at 235-39 (discussing gun prohibition in England).
350. Wills, supra note 30, at 72.
351. Id. (commenting that Madison proposed the Second Amendment "[flor the
same reason that he proposed the Third," and that it therefore, like the Third
Amendment, had no meaning).
352. See id. According to Wills, Madison knew that he could best counter the
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part of "anti-royal rhetoric."" Thus the Third Amendment
"had no real meaning in a government that is authorized to
build barracks, forts, and camps." 55 Wills's conclusion is de-
monstrably short-sighted. Of course Congress can build forts,
but if the costs of maintaining a standing army proved great,
Congress might wish to economize by quartering troops in pri-
vate homes. Furthermore, quartering troops "on" a population
need not only be a cost cutting measure. It might operate as a
direct punishment of recalcitrant groups or areas."' The Third
Amendment speaks directly to these issues with real meaning.
A more charitable, traditional, and correct view of Madison is
that he entered the ratification debates and wrote The Federalist
essays believing that a bill of rights was unnecessary and poten-
tially harmful, because of the inability to list all human rights
and therefore the costs of possibly omitting something impor-
tant.35 ' Thomas Jefferson disagreed with Madison about the
need for a bill of rights."' 8 The Antifederalists vehemently dis-
agreed,359 and Madison's opponent in the election for the First
Congress, James Monroe, disagreed as well.360 Madison then
became a supporter of a bill of rights.3 6' Wills claimed that this
Antifederalists' opposition to the Constitution by accommodating them with the cre-
ation of a bill of rights. See id. When drafting the Second Amendment, Madison
"crafted an amendment that did not prevent the standing army (and was not meant
to) but drew on popular terms that were used for that purpose in the past." Id.
353. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."
U.S. CONST. amend. Ill.
354. See Wills, supra note 30, at 72.
355. Id.
356. Note that even aside from the quartering of troops in private homes, the Dec-
laration of Independence complained about Britain leaving a standing army in the
colonies after the conclusion of the French and Indian War. See THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 261, at 251, 253; see also supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 205, at 309-13 (explaining the various reasons
that Madison and other Federalists opposed having a bill of rights).
358. See id. at 331-33 (stating that Thomas Jefferson made repeated pleas to Madi-
son for a bill of rights).
359. See id. at 314 (establishing that the Antifederalists' most common complaint
about the proposed Constitution was that it lacked a bill of rights).
360. See id. at 335 (stating that Monroe called for another convention in order to
make amendments to the constitution).
361. See id.
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support was tactical, quoting Madison's statement that "this will
kill the opposition everywhere." 62
Wills is only partially correct, as Jack Rakove's extraordinary
new book, Original Meanings, shows.363 Madison's support for
a bill of rights was, indeed, reluctant. The experiences of his
adult life had convinced him that the dangers in a republic were
those stemming from majoritarian excess. He was skeptical that
any limitations-parchment barriers--could check a determined
majority. That applied to a bill of rights as well." Neverthe-
less, Madison did not need to do anything in 1789. There was no
implicit, much less explicit promise of amendments to gain rati-
fication in the decisive and divided states of Virginia,
Massachusetts, and New York. The imperative for amendments
had passed. "Most Federalists had grown indifferent to the ques-
tions, nor were former Anti-Federalists now sitting in Congress
any more insistent, largely because they knew that the substan-
tive changes desired in the Constitution lay beyond their
reach. ,3 65
On June 8, 1789, Madison introduced his bill of rights and
delivered a sophisticated justification, invoking judicial supervi-
sion 66 as well as the need and method of protecting against
omissions. 6 7 Wills would have us believe that Madison did not
mean what he said; he was just carrying on a charade. The only
evidence that Wills offers to support this theory is that
362. See Wills, supra note 30, at 72. Madison made the statement in a letter to
Richard Peters during the House deliberations on the amendments to the Constitu-
tion. See Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in 12 PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 187, at 346-47. See id. Madison offered a num-
ber of thoughts about the amendments, including the one quoted by Wills. Madison
clearly wished to preclude the possibility of the Antifederalists "blow[ing] the trum-
pet for a second Convention," which might undo the work of the Philadelphia Con-
vention. See id.
363. RAKOVE, supra note 208.
364. See id. at 310-16.
365. Id. at 330.
366. See House of Representatives Debates, May-June, 1789 (June 8, 1789) (state-
ment of James Madison), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 261, at 1031
("[The courts] will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights express-
ly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.").
367. See id. at 1027 ("The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just impor-
tance of other rights retained by the people.").
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Antifederalists like Robert Whitehill and Patrick Henry, who
had demanded a bill of rights during the ratification debates,
"changed their stance and opposed the amendments."U5 s A bet-
ter reason ought to be offered to justify not taking Madison at
his word.
Wills's claim that Madison snookered the Antifederalists by
offering them military amendments without meaning could be
generalized. Wills's rationale could as easily be applied to guar-
antees of press, speech, religion, jury trials, search warrants,
everything. Yet evidence exists that Madison cared deeply about
the religion clauses, as they are perfectly consistent with his
famous 1785 statement, A Memorial and Remonstrance.319 Is
Wills asking us to doubt Madison's sincerity on this point too?
Most likely, Wills implicitly is making the claim that Madison
was serious about parts of the Bill of Rights, but not others. Ac-
cording to this theory, he cared about the clauses having
meaning, not those lacking meaning: the Second and Third
Amendments."'0 This analytical process has been a lengthy cir-
cle, but it is still a circle. Wills has divined Madison's intent
from Wills's own extended linguistic analysis of the amend-
ments:371' because they mean nothing to Wills, ergo Madison in-
tended them to mean nothing.
Let us nevertheless assume that Wills is correct and that
Madison truly intended the Second Amendment to be meaning-
less. So what? The people, not Madison, adopted the Second
Amendment because sovereignty rested in the people. 72 The
368. See Wills, supra note 30, at 72 (emphasis omitted). It is interesting that Wills
relied on Whitehill here, given that he earlier chided others for relying on Whitehill,
whom he described as an obstructionist willing to "throw up any, even the wildest,
objection to the Constitution." Id. at 65. Henry's change of position may be more
plausible given his implacable opposition to the Constitution. He had hoped that the
lack of a bill of rights would be a dealbreaker. See id. at 72. The only serious
chance of eradicating the ratified Constitution was to hold a second convention,
something that Madison's proposed bill of rights likely would make impossible. This
does not make Henry the arbiter of Madison's veracity.
369. See James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 187, at 298.
370. See supra note 351.
371. At this point, as so often occurs at difficult interpretive points, one interpre-
tive modality slides into another. For Wills, text and intent may well have become
one and the same.
372. See supra note 339. The People, of course, did so through their representative
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people adopted the Second Amendment as written, not
Madison's "shrewd ploy." Therefore, the controlling understand-
ing of the Second Amendment would be the understanding of the
people, not the understanding of the deceivers. By definition, if
the Framers intend a ruse, their masked intent is irrelevant.73
At this point, doctrinal argument answers the question of
what to do with meaningless text. At least since Marbury v.
Madison, it has been a canon of constitutional construction that
"[ilt cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it." 374 Thus Wills
could be right, but Marbury renders his conclusion irrelevant. If
there are alternative constructions that could give the Second
Amendment meaning, they must be adopted.375 As we have
seen, such constructions are available. By Marbury's own terms
they would prevail over a construction that rendered the amend-
ment without effect. It makes no sense to declare a clause a
dead letter when an alternate reading gives it meaningful life.
Although I find myself surprised by my own words, the histor-
ical claim for the individual rights view of the Second Amend-
bodies. Historical argument depends on the understanding of those who adopted the
relevant provision. With the Constitution itself, ascertaining the people's intent is
ambiguous because the Convention was an extralegal body and the Framers' intent
is normally, but not necessarily, the best evidence of the people's and ratifiers' in-
tent. With subsequent amendments, however, the ambiguity vanishes. The intent of
both the proposing Congress and ratifying state legislatures counts because both are
constitutionally essential to the process as the designated representatives of the peo-
ple. See generally Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A Fake Claim
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986) (rejecting the theory that
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment permits nonpreferential aid to re-
ligion, after analyzing the intent of Congress in passing the Amendment).
373. Wills should know this. His Second Amendment writings are less an example
of his normally sure historical analysis, than they are of bad lawyering. By this
point more than a few readers may be wondering why I am eviscerating an article
in The New York Review of Books, Wills, supra note 30, that is written by someone
who has won two Pulitzer Prizes for his historical writing but who has no legal
training. The answer is that this article, along with Cress's work, supra note 318,
constitutes the entire historical claim that the Second Amendment does not guaran-
tee individual rights. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text. The others who
have asserted this claim have made no serious effort to support it historically.
374. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
375. See id.
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ment seems at least as strong as the historical claim for a
strongly individualist First Amendment. Words and guns en-
abled a successful revolution, and it is not surprising that the
founding generation thought highly of both. William Cushing,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
wrote in a letter to John Adams: "Without this liberty of the
press could we have supported our liberties against british ad-
ministration? or could our revolution have taken place? Pretty
certainly it could not."376 There are far more references from
authoritative sources of an individual right to bear arms than
there are for a right of the press going beyond prior re-
straints.
377
Originalism reached its nadir with the debate over Robert.
Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court.378 It seemingly be-
came more acceptable as two other Yalies, Bruce Ackerman and
Akhil Amar, have attempted to create a liberal originalism.37 s
The neutral observer is likely to be uneasy about ceding consti-
tutional determinations either to advocate-historians, whether
they be liberal or conservative (or Ivy pedigreed) or to those
dead for longer than a century and a half. Like life itself, the
Constitution is for the living. Still, constitutional interpretation
owes some homage to the concerns of the ratifying genera-
tion.38 One need not accept originalism, but in construing the
Second Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution, it
is important to acknowledge what that generation intended.
D. Tradition
Traditional argument acknowledges that our understanding of
the Constitution changes as the nation changes, and it requires
a sensitive reading of where we have been to fashion the Consti-
376. Letter from William Cushing, Chief Justice of Massachusetts, to John Adams
(Feb. 18, 1789), quoted in LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at 199.
377. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 38; Reynolds, supra note 7; Shalhope, supra note 38.
378. See Book Note, The Priest Who Kept His Faith but Lost His Job, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 2074, 2077 (1990) (noting that Bork, who "casts himself as the high priest of
originalism," was rejected as a Supreme Court nominee).
379. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); Amar, Constitution,
supra note 40; Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 40.
380. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
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tution to accommodate where we are going. No one has ever ex-
plained it better than Justice John M. Harlan when he stated
that decisions must recognize "the balance struck by this coun-
try, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. That tradition is a living thing" and it serves to highlight
the balance between "liberty [of the individual] and the demands
of organized society."38' This principle distinguishes traditional
argument from historical argument. The former looks to all our
history to fix the meaning of a provision in the present; the lat-
ter looks to the pre-Constitution history to fix the meaning of a
provision at the founding.
Justice Harlan was explaining traditional argument in its nat-
ural setting, determining the contours of due process,382 where
a less elevated description of the process is that it takes a right
we value highly and protects it even more. Nevertheless, tradi-
tional argument is not confined to due process. Because of the
selective incorporation doctrine, traditional argument is funda-
mental to whether a particular provision of the Bill of Rights is
incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. When Justice Cardozo explained that the First
Amendment was "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom,"383 he did so in the context
of explaining why the First Amendment applies to the states but
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not.3"
Traditional argument, as explained by Justice Harlan, also
plays a central role in First Amendment jurisprudence.385 It is
381. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
382. See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
383. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
384. See id. at 326-28.
385. Amazingly, we have had a First Amendment tradition from the beginning be-
cause of the work of Zechariah Chafee. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (1941); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); Zech-
ariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1918, at 66; Zecha-
riah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919).
Chafee misrepresented Holmes's initial position to help foster the "cause" of free
speech. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205, 1211 (1983) (stating that Chafee misconstrued Holmes's
opinions in order to reach the conclusion that they both had the same libertarian
views); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J.
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not coincidence that the title of Harry Kalven's posthumous
magnum opus on the First Amendment is A Worthy Tradi-
tion, 38 6 and the title perfectly summarizes the role of tradition
in First Amendment argument. A dominant strand of First
Amendment thought incorporates a whiggish view of history as
almost always progressing, hopefully approaching perfection.
Our First Amendment tradition is well understood. Milton's
Areopagitica,387  the end of licensing,88  Zenger,38 9 and the
American Revolution are antecedents. Then there is the First
Amendment, too quickly followed by the fall from grace of the
Sedition Act."' The tradition moves to the suppression of dis-
sent in World War I, highlighting the great dissenting opinions
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, 9' celebrates their moving
from dissents to doctrine and the creation of the "preferred posi-
tion."3 92 The tradition is then dismayed by the regression of
Dennis 93 and the communist cases,3 9 but simultaneously ac-
quired new dissenting heroes in Justices Black and Douglas, and
applauds the restoration of the First Amendment with the Civil
514, 589-91 (1990) [hereinafter Rabban, Forgotten Years].
386. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
387. John Milton, Areopagitica, in THE PROSE -OF JOHN MILTON 265 (J. Max Pat-
rick ed., 1967). Readers' knowledge of Milton's classic is too often limited to the fre-
quently quoted sentences. Thankfully, Vincent Blasi has brought the full work alive
in a recent paper. Vincent Blasi, Milton's Areopagitica and the Modern First Amend-
ment, YALE L. SCH. OCCASIONAL PAPERS (Visited Oct. 7, 1996) <http'J/www.yale.edu/-
lawweb/lawschool/occpaper/blasi.htmb.
388. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
389. See LEVY, FREE PRESS, supra note 213, at 38-45; POWE, supra note 105, at 7-
15 (discussing the Zenger case, a prosecution for seditious libel); supra text accompa-
nying notes 224-25.
390. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
391. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 300, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., dissenting);
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, J.J., dissent-
ing); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
392. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.").
393. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
394. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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Rights Cases.3 95  From Sullivan396  to Brandenburg397  to
Cohen,3 "  First Amendment doctrine was "working itself
pure. s9  That this whiggish history is incomplete and
wrong4° ° is not important; what is important is that the First
Amendment celebrates the whiggish tale as if it were true.
The consequence of the First Amendment's worthy tradition is
a doctrine that grants extraordinary protection to expression. Al-
though that doctrine largely was developed to protect liberal
minorities from conservative majorities, it has proven quite im-
pervious to the efforts of the last fifteen years to censor conser-
vative speech. The First Amendment literature is gleefully incor-
porating the rejection of censorious liberals into the tradi-
tion.40
1
It is not surprising that there is no comparable Second
Amendment tradition, for the Second Amendment experience
largely is the mirror image of the First. When the First Amend-
ment was ignored and "forgotten"4 2 in the nineteenth century,
the Second Amendment was celebrated. Where as the First
Amendment freely crosses the Atlantic to embrace John
395. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); HARRY KALVEN, JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
396. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
397. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
398. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
399. KALVEN, supra note 386, at xvii.
400. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendment,
McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 267 (1989) (discussing Justice
Douglas's influence on the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence); see also
David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of
Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992) (discussing the influ-
ence of the ACLU and The Free Speech League on the Supreme Court's post-World
War I First Amendment jurisprudence); David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech
Fights and Popular Conceptions of Free Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L.
REV. 1055 (1994) (discussing the effects of the IWW free speech fights on the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment).
401. See Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defence,
13 CONST. COMMENTARY 71 (1996); Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The
Constitutional Status of Unconstitutional Speech, 48 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1995); L.A.
Powe, Jr., The Free Speech Paradigm and Its Critics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RESOURCE CENTER 48 (Stanley
Ingber ed., 1995).
402. See generally Rabban, Forgotten Years, supra note 385 (discussing the histori-
cal interpretation of the First Amendment prior to 1917).
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Milton 403 and John Stuart Mill,40 4 the Second Amendment
seemingly draws blanks. When the First Amendment began its
incredible ascendancy after the dissents by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis,4 5 the Second Amendment got Justice McReynolds's
opinion in Miller.408
Yet, as the history shows, there was once a gravitas to the
Second Amendment. We have seen the importance to the First
Amendment of St. George Tucker's American edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries.°7 When Tucker placed sovereignty
in the people, he cut through the prior restraint/subsequent pun-
ishment dichotomy, because a sovereign people could not at any
time be silenced by their temporary agents. 8 To the extent
that we credit Tucker with his prescience about the First
Amendment, we must note also that he exalted the Second
Amendment. Furthermore, Tucker thought that the Second
Amendment, not the First, held the key to American liberty.4 9
After quoting the Amendment, he stated: 'This may be consid-
ered as the true palladium of liberty."410
Tucker contrasted the United States with Great Britain where
he believed that "the right of keeping arms is effectually taken
away from the people of England."41' This was not so in Ameri-
ca, because of the Second Amendment's guarantee that people
could bear arms "without any qualification as to their condition
or degree, as is the case in the British government."412 Accord-
ingly, Americans could exercise the "right of self defence[,] the
first law of nature." 3 Americans could also protect their 'lib-
erty" which, in lands with standing armies but no individual
right to bear arms, "if not already annihilated, [was] on the
403. See Milton, supra note 387.
404. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
405. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 107-53 and accompanying text.
407. See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. at 300 (1803)
[hereinafter TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE].
408. See id., app. at 297.
409. See id., app. at 300.
410. Id.
411. 2 id- at 143 n.41.
412. Id. at 143 n.40.
413. 1 id., app. at 300.
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brink of destruction."414 Just as Tucker cut through the prior
restraint/subsequent punishment dichotomy to note that to be
effective, the First Amendment had to prohibit both, so he broke
through the private possession/state control dichotomy to con-
clude that to be effective, the Second Amendment had to guaran-
tee individual possession of arms.
A quarter of a century later, Justice Joseph Story reiterated
Tucker's praise of the Second Amendment.415 Like Tucker, Sto-
ry called it "the palladium of the liberties of a republic" and
stated that it "offers a strong moral check against the usurpa-
tion and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if
these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to
resist, and triumph over them."4 6 Story, however, added a cau-
tionary note based on the fact that militia service was falling
from favor and was perceived as burdensome.417
Possibly because of the waning favor of the militia, it was dur-
ing this period that the first post-Constitution state constitu-
tions that omitted a right to bear arms clause were written. Io-
wa,4"8 Wisconsin,49 Minnesota,42  and California42 did not
guarantee the right. During the same period, however, Arkan-
sas,422 Michigan,423 Texas,424 and Oregon425 did. One of the
Civil War states, Kansas, guaranteed a right to bear arms,42
but Nevada427 and West Virginia428 did not. The debates in
Congress in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War demon-
414. Id.
415. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co., abridged ed. 1833).
416. Id. § 1001.
417. See id.
418. See 3 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 434-48
(William F. Swindler ed., 1974).
419. See 10 id. at 418-45 (1979).
420. See 5 id. at 303-18 (1975).
421. See 1 id. at 469-508 (1973).
422. See id. at 381, 382.
423. See 5 id. at 204, 205 (1975).
424. See 9 id. at 249, 258 (1979).
425. See 8 id. at 205, 206.
426. See 4 id. at 82, 83 (1975).
427. See 6 id. at 263-282 (1976).
428. See 10 id. at 341-61 (1979).
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strated, however, that an armed populace had lost little of its
importance to a new generation of constitutional framers.429
The Bill of Rights had responded to perceived fears of a strong
and overreaching Federal Government.43 0 The Fourteenth
Amendment responded to actual abuses by state governments in
the years leading to the Civil War and especially in the year after
the surrender at Appomattox, when Southern State after
Southern State adopted laws to reduce the freedmen to serf-
dom.431 Congress first responded by adopting the Freedmen's
Bureau Act 432 and the Civil Rights Act4 33 over presidential
vetoes and objections that the Thirteenth Amendment did not
provide constitutional authority for their provisions.4 34 The
Fourteenth Amendment was designed, in part, to end any such
questions.4 35 Additionally, as Eric Foner stated, the Fourteenth
Amendment "was deemed necessary, in part, precisely because
[freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, trial by impartial jury,
and protection against cruel and unusual punishment and un-
reasonable search and seizure were] being systematically violated
in the South in 1866" and Congress wished to guarantee the
protection of these rights against future state abridgement.436
Evidence exists for the proposition that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended to incorporate the protections
of the entire Bill of Rights against state action.437 There is
even better evidence that they intended to guarantee freedom of
speech, the right to bear arms, and the right to an impartial
jury against state action.43 The Fourteenth Amendment tar-
geted the South and the actual abuses being perpetrated
429. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 135-42 (1984).
430. See STORY, supra note 415, §§ 980-81.
431. See FONER, supra note 81, at 258-59.
432. ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865).
433. ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
434. See FONER, supra note 81, at 243-50.
435. See id. at 258-59.
436. See id.
437. See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986) (dis-
cussing the historical development of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its subsequent
interpretation by the courts).
438. Cf. HALBROOK, supra note 429, at 107-23.
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there.439 The newly freed blacks needed to be able to protect
themselves."'
Evidence of the Framers' intent to incorporate the whole Bill of
Rights was central to Justice Black,"' but has been irrelevant
to the other Justices, who collectively have taken a variety of
approaches to the issue of the applicability of the Bill of Rights to
the states."2  At one time, when Cruikshank,"3  Presser,'
and Patterson445 were newly decided, the Bill of Rights had no
applicability to the states."6 Beginning with Palko v. Con-
necticut,"7 however, the Court, openly and self-consciously, be-
gan to selectively incorporate some guarantees but not oth-
ers.448 Justice Cardozo explained that although certain provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights might "have value and importance,"
that was not enough; instead, they had to be "the very essence of
a scheme of ordered liberty." 9 In other words, only those provi-
sions "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental" were incorporated.4 0
Palko collapsed in the 1960s when the Court was incorporat-
ing every provision of the Bill of Rights that it considered.45'
Duncan v. Louisiana explained the newer approach as rejecting
Palko's idealized and imagined system and inquiring into the
439. See FONER, supra note 81, at 258-59.
440. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 429, at 110.
441. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
442. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601-02 (1900) (discounting the signifi-
cance of congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment).
443. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
444. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
445. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
446. "The [Flirst [A]mendment . . . like the other amendments proposed and adopt-
ed at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the state government
in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone."
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
447. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
448. The Court had already, but without serious explanation, incorporated the
speech, press, and takings clauses. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (speech and press); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 236-37 (1897) (takings).
449. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
450. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
451. See CURTIS, supra note 437, at 202-03.
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reality of American practice."2 Thus the right of a criminal ju-
ry trial was incorporated because all states guaranteed it;
455
for purposes of incorporation, a right is fundamental if it ap-
pears in the Bill of Rights and it is widely accepted by the
states, either through their constitutions or their common
law.4" The rash of Supreme Court incorporation decisions,
however, left two obvious provisions for incorporation untouched:
the Second and Seventh Amendments. 455 Both issues have
been raised, but the Court has refused to review them.45
If review were granted on a Second Amendment case, the
"correct" outcome might not be so clear. Under the Duncan ap-
proach, the Second Amendment claim easily is stated: the right
to bear arms is found in the Bill of Rights and in forty-three of
the fifty state constitutions (including the two states admitted to
the union in the mid-twentieth century).45" The argument
against incorporation could come from one of several directions.
The first would be consequentialist and easily stated: Guns kill,
so allowing civilians to have them is bad policy. The second is
likely to be the least persuasive: Forty-three states is a lot, but
not enough to override the values of federalism and the wishes
of the other seven.458 The third would be that simply balancing
452. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968).
453. See id. at 155-56.
454. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (finding the guarantee
against double jeopardy to be fundamental).
455. "The Seventh Amendment governs proceedings in federal court, but not in
state court ... ." Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2222
(1996). The Third Amendment and the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury also
are not incorporated. The former probably would be if any state violated it; the lat-
ter is not because too many states have discarded the grand jury requirement.
456. See Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64
(1995) (involving the Second Amendment); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (involving the Second
Amendment); Colclasure v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 720 S.W.2d 916 (Ark. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987) (involving the Seventh Amendment); Sharpe v.
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
904 (1969) (involving the Seventh Amendment).
457. See David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in
State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177, 1180 n.13 (1995) (listing the relevant
text from all the state constitutions). Only Illinois facially seems to allow negation of
the very right protected: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the individ-
ual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
458. California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin.
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the decisions of forty-three states against the decisions of seven
misses the point of our traditions. A long time ago, there was a
tradition of bearing arms, but that tradition has been lost for
most of a century, and it is not to be regained by judicial fiat.
If incorporation is not certain under Duncan, how might the
issue be decided under Palko? If the question is whether the
right was of the "very essence of ordered liberty" in 1791 or
1868, then the answers would be "yes" and "probably yes." Call-
ing the Second Amendment the "palladium of liberty"459 is
roughly equivalent to calling the First Amendment the "indis-
pensable condition[ ] of nearly every other form of freedom."46 °
If the date were 1937, however, it would seem inconceivable that
the elite in American society would talk of the Second Amend-
ment in such terms. After 1968, and the assassinations of Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, inconceivable becomes
impossible.
The collective rights theory obviates all of these problems
dealing with incorporation.461 If no individual can claim the
right to bear arms, there is no issue. If the "right" exists in the
State, incorporation against state interference is utterly incom-
prehensible.462
The collective rights theory, however, has weaknesses stem-
ming from the debates in the post-Civil War thirty-ninth Con-
gress. Militia service had now disappeared from the discussions
of the right to bear arms.46 Northern Republicans were hardly
interested in creating a new Southern armed force, but they
were interested in protecting blacks.4" Also, the civic republi-
canism prevalent in the founding generation was gone. There
was no argument about the necessary preconditions of civic
See Kopel et al., supra note 457, at 1180 n.13 (omitting these states from the list of
those with constitutional guarantees of a right to bear arms).
459. See supra notes 410 & 416 and accompanying text.
460. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
461. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
462. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed.
1988). The Establishment Clause posed an identical problem and this was part of
the reason for recognizing that it must create an individual right. See, e.g., Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
463. Cf. HALBROOK, supra note 429, at 139.
464. See id. at 109-10.
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virtue; Republicans cared about self-defense for their allies in an
openly hostile environment.465 No one has offered any evidence
to suggest that the Framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought in terms of a collective right to own guns.
This creates an interesting originalist possibility. Even assum-
ing that the Second Amendment is about a collective right, the
Fourteenth Amendment, linguistically and by intent, was
not.468 Therefore, if the collective rights theory has any control-
ling historical validity, the federal government could limit arms
to organized militias, but state governments could not. A right
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects is individual and
states may not abridge it, once the Court declares that right to
be encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment.467
Through 1866, there was a strong, consistent belief in the
right to bear arms. This belief is reflected years later in Thomas
Cooley's General Principles of Constitutional Law, in which he
wrote that "the people, from whom the militia must be taken,
shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no
permission or regulation of law for the purpose."468 Yet this
view was shattered within a century. The beginnings came dur-
ing Reconstruction, when, not surprisingly, the Republicans' be-
lief that the freedmen needed to be armed was not shared by
white southerners.469 Clayton Cramer has noted that the years
following the Civil War witnessed a burst of legislation to re-
strict the right to carry arms, in both the former Confederacy
and former slave-states that had remained in the Union.4 0
465. See CURTIS, supra note 437, at 55-56.
466. Cf id. at 219.
467. Daniel Polsby has suggested that Congress use its powers under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment in order to establish legislatively that the Second
Amendment is applicable against the states. See Daniel D. Polsby, Second Reading,
REASON, Mar. 1996, at 32, 34. Such drastic action probably would result in a Su-
preme Court ruling on the issue.
468. THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 282 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 2d ed. 1891).
469. See WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, REpONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
1865-1877, at 58 (1907) ("he restrictions in respect to bearing arms, testifying in
court, and keeping labor contracts were justified by well-established traits and habits
of the negroes . . ").
470. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR TBE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE:
THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND
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Kates suggests that the target of the legislation was the freed-
men, and there is no reason to doubt this conclusion.47 Thus,
even as convictions of white defendants were overturned, the
laws were upheld for use in other circumstances.472 In 1941, a
Florida Supreme Court judge in exactly these circumstances
quite candidly said that everyone knew why these laws had been
enacted: blacks, but not whites, were to be disarmed.473
The South led, and eventually the rest of the nation followed,
with restrictions on both the concealed and open carrying of
weapons.474 New York's Sullivan Law of 19114"5 required the
licensing of handguns after both the New York Times and the
New York Tribune complained of armed immigrants.476 On the
West Coast, fears of Asian immigrants led to restrictive mea-
sures.477 Fear of those who were different led whites to de-
mand limitations on bearing arms.
In the twentieth century both laws and elite opinion have
questioned the Second Amendment, and this questioning became
virtually universal after the assassinations of King and Kenne-
dy. As a result, the collective rights theory "flowered in the
1960s or '70s as a prop in national political debates about gun
control laws."47 As the elite's disdain for guns grew, the Sec-
ond Amendment became the only provision of the Bill of Rights
to be attacked publicly by (retired) Supreme Court Justices War-
ren Burger479 and Lewis Powell.4"' The epithet "gun nut" too
BEAR ARMS 97-140 (1994).
471. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United
States, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS 7, 14-15 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1979).
472. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 470, at 138.
473. See Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring).
474. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 471, at 14-15.
475. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (Consol. 1911).
476. See, e.g., DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 342-43 (1992).
477. Cf id. at 343.
478. Polsby, supra note 467, at 35. The collective rights theory first was adopted
by that name in City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905), but had one
judicial antecedent in State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. *18, *24-*25 (1842), which held that
the right to bear arms was limited to the militia.
479. See Cottroll & Diamond, supra note 180, at 997 n.8 (citing Warren Burger's
comment, on the MacNeillLehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991)
that the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights was a mistake).
480. See Nancy Blodgett, Powell: What Right to Own Guns?, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1,
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often placed NRA members in similar categories with racists,
cult members like Branch Davidians, and pornographers. When
celebrating the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch offered a Second Amendment story that contained
a lengthy segment by a woman whose brother had been shot by
a criminal.' It did not run a parallel piece about a Holocaust
survivor describing her feelings about the Nazi march in
Skokie.
482
If one needed a synthesis, all that would be required is to
open the pages of the 1989 Yale Law Journal to Professor
Wendy Brown's comments about a helpful hunter who, as a good
Samaritan, assisted her and a companion, far from the nearest
AAA tow truck, with a car problem: Brown stereotypes the hunt-
er as a would-be rapist.s Yet for all the negative stereotypes
among elites, four states amended their constitutions in the
1980s to protect, for the first time, the right to possess arms.48
Furthermore, nonelite opinion seems to believe, contrary to
Dean Griswold,485 that there is a right to bear arms.486
Like the actions of the white South after the Civil War, there
is ample material here for the making and telling of a
tradition.487 But what makes the First Amendment tradition
1988, at 30 (citing Powell's assertion at ABA annual meeting that handguns may be
barred despite the Second Amendment).
481. See Tim Poor, The Gun Debate: For Regulation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 19, 1991, at C1.
482. Cf Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978) (holding that members of the Na-
tional Socialist Party of America had a constitutionally protected right to hold a
demonstration in Skokie, Illinois, even though the demonstration would involve the
use of Nazi symbols that were highly offensive to the town's Jewish population).
483. See Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republican-
ism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
661, 666 (1989). But see Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8
CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 397-403 (1991) (denouncing Brown's stereotyping of the
hunter who had assisted her).
484. Delaware, Nebraska, North Dakota, and West Virginia. See generally, Kopel et
al., supra note 457, at 1180 n.13.
485. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
486. See Gordon Witken et al., The Fight to Bear Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 22, 1995 at 28, 29 (citing statistics showing that 75% of American voters be-
lieve the Constitution guarantees them the right to own guns).
487. The material surely would include examples of liberal hypocrisy. One such
example is newspaper columnist Carl Rowan, who publicly advocated banning guns
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successful-a combination of academic and judicial support, as
well as popular support by the press-is missing at both ends of
Second Amendment tradition. Academics claiming Second
Amendment parity with other rights have been too wedded to
historical and textual argument-unable to see that there is
much more to constitutional argument and analysis. What the
Second Amendment needs is a coherent tradition that embraces
the good while explaining and accommodating the bad.4 8 Per-
haps, however, such a tradition cannot yet be written.
This requires considering the interesting constitutional possi-
bility that the Second Amendment died sometime in the past
125 years. David Williams has authored two excellent articles
that combine taking the Second Amendment seriously with pro-
claiming its death.4"9 Both articles center on the civic republi-
can basis of the Amendment.49 The first article joined Profes-
sor Brown in proclaiming civic virtue dead and suggesting that
the Second Amendment went with it.49' There are. three prob-
lems with this thesis. First, someone more authoritative than an
academic must sign civic virtue's death certificate. Second, there
is more to the Second Amendment than republican-
ism-especially in the events surrounding the inception of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when republicanism was nonexistent.
Third, the Second Amendment can exist without republicanism,
even though Williams may find this prospect "terrifying."492
Williams's second article states that the Second Amendment
presupposed a unitary "people," and as a nation we no longer
and yet owned an unregistered gun himself, which he used to shoot at trespassers
in his yard. See Columnist Rowan Shoots Man Who Entered Yard, CHICAGO TRIB.,
June 15, 1988, at 3; Carl Rowan, Deranged Must be Disarmed, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRI., Aug. 25, 1986, at B7. Another example is the New York Times editorializing
against guns, although its publisher is one of the few New York residents granted a
permit to carry a concealed weapon. See Kates, supra note 38, at 208 & n.17; The
Real Politics of Guns, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1983, at A30.
488. Some readers may believe that such a tradition already has been written. My
best answer is that I think I would know it if I read it. Quite obviously, supplying
a Second Amendment tradition is vastly beyond the scope of this enterprise.
489. See Williams, supra note 1; Williams, supra note 319.
490. See Williams, supra note 1, at 881, 887; Williams, supra note 319, at 552-53.
491. See Williams, supra note 319, at 554-56.
492. See id. at 553.
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are one people.493 Again, there are three problems with this
thesis, parallelling those of his initial attempt. First, this conclu-
sion would make too many Yale professors unemployable.494
Second, the Constitution seems to presume conclusively that we
are one people. Third, the right to bear arms can exist in a
many-peopled society.
Still, Williams highlights an important question of whether
unamended parts of the Constitution can die.495  Bruce
Ackerman's concept of "constitutional moments"496 might ex-
plain how this could happen, but it seems unhelpful here be-
cause even if Ackerman's concept is valid, if the Second Amend-
ment is dead, it slipped away over time and not in a constitu-
tional moment. The Second Amendment tradition may be the
opposite of the First's and may really consist of the telling of
how a right went from the "palladium of liberty""49 to the con-
stitutional graveyard.
The Contracts Clause,4 98 the heart of nineteenth century
rights jurisprudence,4 99 offers an interesting analogy of consti-
tutional morbidity. Recall that the core of early Contracts Clause
jurisprudence was a prohibition on state enactment of debtor
relief laws." Recall also that Chief Justice Hughes sustained
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law in Home Building and
Loan Association v. Blaisdell.0 1
Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Blaisdell spent a lot of time
trying to explain why the debtor relief law did not impair the
obligation of contract as the text of the Contracts Clause, its his-
tory, and prior Supreme Court opinions indicated. 2 A fair
493. See Williams, supra note 1, at 908-11.
494. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119,
1147 (1995) ("Who today speaks of 'We the People,' other than demagogues,
originalists, and Yale law professors?").
495. See Williams, supra note 319, at 554.
496. See Bruce A.- Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984).
497. See supra text accompanying notes 410 & 416.
498. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, c. 1.
499. See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 257-58 (1938).
500. See id. at 19.
501. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
502. See id. at 442-44.
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reading seems to be that: (1) times change; °3 (2) Minnesota
had not adopted repudiation of debts as state policy;" 4 and
therefore (3) reasonable, temporary impairments are
constitutional." 5
A like analysis fits the Second Amendment quite well; (1) ob-
viously times change and rights change with them; °. (2) nei-
ther the federal Government nor any state has ever adopted a
policy of total gun control; and (3) accordingly, reasonable limits
on gun ownership are constitutional. Putting together points (2)
and (3) in practical and doctrinal terms means that so long as at
least one type of weapon, such as hunting rifles, is not banned,
any other regulation would be valid."7
The subsequent history of the Contracts Clause is not wholly
consistent with my suggested reading of Blaisdell, but it is close
enough for constitutional analysis. Only twice in the six decades
since Blaisdell has the Court found that a state statute went too
far in eliminating rights of contract.0 5  Actually, Second
Amendment advocates might envy such a record, because it far
exceeds theirs. Nevertheless, traditional argument, with its em-
phasis on what history teaches us, can cut two ways. It can
overprotect the highly popular and it can underprotect the con-
sistently unpopular.
In the former situation, it takes something that is well pro-
tected-like freedom of expression, liberty of contract, or sexual
intimacies in marriage-and protects it even more. The result
typically is that outlying communities are brought within a na-
tional consensus.
503. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("We must consider what
this country has become" in interpreting the Constitution).
504. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439 (stating that states would not be permitted to
adopt a policy of repudiating debts or destroying contracts).
505. See id.
506. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (noting that
"rights under the Equal Protection Clause are not tied to historic notions of equality").
507. Such regulation would be upheld because it would be subject only to the ratio-
nal basis test.
508. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking down a
Minnesota statute that imposed a penalty on certain employers for terminating their
employee pension plan); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
(prohibiting retroactive repeal of an interstate covenant that would have impacted
Port Authority bond holders).
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The latter situation, underprotecting the consistently unpopu-
lar, is more troubling because it is a way that a constitutional
provision may wither or die without formal action of Congress
and the state legislatures to change it. Obviously, a guarantee of
a right found in the Constitution got there because it once was
thought to be important. In the case of the right to keep and
bear arms, this lasted at least through the Reconstruction
Era."9 Over time, however, majorities, aided by the opinions of
the dominant elite, have wished the right would vanish. Indeed,
legal elites have claimed that Miller already did the disappear-
ing act.51° To the extent that traditional argument gives a con-
stitutional imprimatur to this, it is troubling, just as Blaisdell
was troubling.
It is troubling because a shift in tradition would justify a ma-
jority committing exactly the type of abuse the Constitution was
designed to prevent. In Blaisdell, changed circumstances meant
that a majority could impose debtor relief laws on the mortgage-
holding minority.51' It may have been no big deal in these cir-
cumstances, because banks and the like could be expected to
protect themselves." 2 In the Second Amendment context, how-
ever, changed .tradition could mean that a majority may disarm
a minority it wishes to oppress, even in the face of language and
an expired tradition that guaranteed the minority a right to
keep and bear arms, partially to preclude government oppres-
sion. To put it bluntly, traditional argument would justify com-
mitting one of the abuses the Amendment was aimed at preclud-
ing. As such it offers confirmation of Madison's underlying worry
that declarations of rights were but "parchment barriers."513
Thus, when we celebrate tradition, we must recognize that it
is not a one-way ratchet, nor is it necessarily a good thing. Hav-
ing said that, it seems inescapable that despite text and history,
509. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
510. But see supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (noting the thinness of
such arjuments).
511. See supra notes 501-05 and accompanying text.
512. Justice Brennan made a similar claim when he voted in support of the legisla-
tion at issue in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 62 n.18
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
513. See RAKOVE, supra note 208, at 310-16.
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the differences in evolution of their respective traditions seem to
best explain the relative constitutional status of the first two
amendments.
E. Structure
Structural argument takes as its starting point the particular
structures and institutions established or recognized by the Con-
stitution, and the relationships among them. Normally, this in-
volves either the checks and balances found among the three
branches of the federal government, the existence of the States
and federalism, or the relationship between representative gov-
ernment and the citizenry. However, as Justice Stewart remind-
ed everyone two decades ago, the Framers created another struc-
ture in the First Amendment: an autonomous press with its abil-
ity to check the excesses of government.514 He did not mention
the Second Amendment, but an arms-bearing populace, either
inside or outside a militia, also empowers the citizens as another
check on government.
The press, Edmund Burke's Fourth Estate,515 has perceived
itself, and in turn has been perceived, as an independent watch-
dog on the government, especially when the three branches of
government are identified singularly as "The Government." In
Stewart's words, the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
the press is "a structural provision" operating "to create a fourth
institution outside the Government as an additional check on
the three official branches."516
First Amendment doctrine has been fashioned to serve the
Fourth Estate model.517 First, and foremost, the press is auton-
omous. Government may not dictate the content of a newspa-
per.518 Second, as the Pentagon Papers Cases demonstrate, on-
514. See Potter Stewart, 'Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
515. See POWE, supra note 105, at 260-61 (noting Burke's characterization of the
press as the "Fourth Estate").
516. Id. at 633-34; see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527.
517. See POWE, supra note 105, at 260-87.
518. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down
Florida's statutory mandate that political candidates be provided with equal print
space in which to reply to editorial comments).
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ly in the most extreme situations may government preclude the
press from publishing damaging information about the
government's actions.519 'The press was protected so that it
could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose decep-
tion in government."520 Should the various branches of govern-
ment establish a policy, the First Amendment guarantees that
the press will be an independent actor with full ability to chal-
lenge the policy. Freedom of speech and the press is, in Justice
Cardozo's words, "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom."52'
In a structural interpretation, the Second Amendment walks
hand-in-hand with the First. If the First Amendment exposure
and protest of government tyranny fail to stop or change a ty-
rannical government, then there is always the Second Amend-
ment and the implicit threat that the people will fight for their
liberties. Structural argument will support either the individual
rights theory or the collective rights theory. A widely armed pop-
ulace offers a keen check on a government bent on usurpation.
Similarly, an armed militia, although obviously no match for a
standing army, is equally available as an immediate check and
as a long-term underground option.
Nevertheless, unlike the First Amendment, the text of the
Constitution is not silent about the federal government's ability
to suppress armed dissent. Article III of the Constitution defines
treason as "levying War against" the United States. 2 Three
other constitutional provisions give the federal government au-
thority against armed rebellion: Article I gives Congress the
power to call forth the militia to "suppress Insurrections;"
523
under Article I Congress also may suspend the writ of habeas
corpus "when in Cases of Rebellion... the public Safety may
require it;"5 and Article IV allows the United States, upon
519. See New York Tiines Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
520. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
521. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 383.
522. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
523. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
524. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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application, to protect a State "against domestic Violence."5" It
is inconceivable that the Second Amendment limits these provi-
sions in any way. If someone takes up arms against the United
States, that person is going to be met with justified constitu-
tional force.
So how does the Second Amendment square with this? At
first, as Garry Wills has claimed,52 it seems not to. A second
look suggests, however, a structural accommodation. Possibly
the Second Amendment can best be understood to incorporate a
common law rule against prior restraints.527 This theory means
that, just as Blackstone's Englishmen had the right to own a
printing press but could be punished for its use against the gov-
ernment, 28 the American people have the right to keep arms
available for the revolution but no right to put them to use in
rebellion or insurrection.529 Checks and balances have their
own logic. Their purpose is to make action difficult, and the Con-
stitution accomplishes this through the pairing of the Second
Amendment with the various rebellion suppression clauses in
the body of the Constitution.
The Federal Government, knowing it faces an armed citizenry,
will be more circumspect in its actions, while simultaneously
serving as a check on the would-be revolutionaries through its
own army. On the one hand, if the checks and balances work
properly, no federal rebellions will occur. If one begins, however,
it should easily be put down. On the other hand, a revolution of
and by the people should succeed just as the American Revolu-
tion did.53
525. See id. art. 4, § 4.
526. See supra notes 320, 340-44 and accompanying text.
527. Many thanks to Doug Laycock for suggesting the analogy upon reading an
earlier draft of this Article.
528. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
529. See Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825) ("The liber-
ty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in
case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who
uses them for annoyance or destruction.") (emphasis added).
530. This was Madison's point in The Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST No.




The collective rights theory perceives the Second Amendment
as protecting a well-organized State militia to serve as a check
on federal tyranny.53' To students of American history, this
sounds familiar. The various Southern state militias protected
the South from Northern aggression under Lincoln. The only
problem is that the South lost. Having lost, and having been
forced to accept the Northern terms of peace-the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments-as well as Northern occupying
troops, is it conceivable that the constitutional right lasted be-
yond Appomattox?5. Perhaps it is. The Constitution does not
guarantee successful revolution, much less immunity for unsuc-
cessful revolutionaries. No one would expect it to. The Southern
failure shows that, in discussing a checking power, it is essential
to remember that the checks really do operate both ways.
Now fast-forward to Little Rock in 1957. With the Arkansas
National Guard preventing the desegregation of Central High
School, President Eisenhower made the decisions to send in the
101st Airborne and to federalize the Guard to remove it as a
potential opposition force.5 3' Does anyone believe that Gover-
nor Orval Faubus successfully could have opposed federalizing
the Guard on the ground that the Second Amendment secured
an independent military to the States to oppose national tyran-
ny?953
4
If the collective rights theory is correct, then its view of the
Second Amendment must have some meaning, and that meaning
has to include an independent state right to void a national or-
der federalizing the Guard. Otherwise, what could a collective
rights constitutional amendment do and mean? We know that
Governor Faubus could not have exercised any constitutional
right with respect to the Arkansas National Guard, and this nec-
essarily means the collective rights theory either is wrong or
dead. What is interesting is that no one espousing a collective
rights view of the Second Amendment has stated that the
531. See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 47, at 1738.
532. See Kates, supra note 38, at 212 ("State's right analysis renders the
amendment little more than a holdover from an era of constitutional philosophy that
received its death knell in the decision rendered at Appomattox Courthouse.").
533. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1958).
534. If so, the result of Cooper should dispel that belief. See id. at 16-19.
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Amendment expired with the Confederacy. That, at least, would
be an honest reading of constitutional history.
5 35
The individual rights theory offers fewer such interpretive
problems, especially with the analogy to the common law rule
against prior restraints. It is conceivable that after the Civil
War, the checking value of an armed citizenry might have fallen
into disrepute. We know, however, that it did not.
The Republicans in the Reconstruction Congress understood
the precarious position of the freed blacks and the white union-
ists within the South and they knew that without arms, they
were at the tender mercies of the losers of the war.5 3' By both
word and deed, they supported a right to bear arms as an essen-
tial ingredient of freedom under the newly adopted Thirteenth
Amendment.5 37 The Freedman's Bureau Act thus spoke to the
"right... to have full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and
[property,] including the constitutional right to bear
arms .... 538 Lest the point be missed, Congress expressed
similar thoughts when it drafted the Fourteenth Amendment. As
Senator Jacob Howard stated on introducing the amendment, it
was designed to protect "personal rights" such as the "right to
keep and to bear arms."539
There are two possible readings of this. One is that the indi-
vidual rights view, held even by advocates of the slavocracy like
Chief Justice Taney,540 was correct and that it continued after
535. See generally Testa v. Kaat, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947) (acknowledging that the
fundamental issues of federal supremacy were resolved by the Civil War).
536. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 429, at 109 ("In Mississippi rebel State forces,
men who were in the rebel armies, are traversing the State, visiting the freedman,
disarming them, perpetrating murders and outrages on them .... " (quoting Senator
Henry Wilson)).
537. See CURTIS, supra note 437, at 52-53, 72, 140.
538. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (continuing in force
and amending the Freedman's Bureau Act).
539. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-65 (1866).
540. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
Nor can Congress deny to the people the right to keep and bear
arms, nor the right to trial by jury, nor compel any one to be a witness
against himself in a criminal proceeding.
These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person .... are, in
express and positive terms, denied to the General Government ....
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the war. The other is that the collective rights view was correct
prior to the Civil War, was lost, was transformed into an indi-
vidual rights claim during Reconstruction, and was codified in
that form in the Fourteenth Amendment.54'
To sum up, structural argument seems to point to one of two
conclusions. Either the Second Amendment was about collective
rights and is now dead, or else it is about individual rights and
remains alive, at least to some extent. In keeping with the as-
sumption that a constitutional provision ought to have some
meaning if possible, it seems that structural argument, even
more than historical argument, throws its weight to the Stan-
dard Model individual rights theory.
F. Consequentialism
Although consequentialist argument has its roots in the nine-
teenth century,542 it is quintessentially a twentieth century
form. It embraces both the policy-oriented demand for the more
effective legal rule and the realist insight that judges operate
within the confines of the political climate. Consequentialist
argument need not prevail, but no area of constitutional law is
immune from its influence because, as Philip Bobbitt has de-
scribed, it is "actuated by the political and economic circum-
stances surrounding" a case.54  Although theoretically
consequentialist argument can cut either way, its most frequent
use is to limit the sweep of the asserted right.5"
Much of modern First Amendment doctrine is a rejection of
the consequentialist argument inherent in the bad tendency test,
Id.
541. Akhil Reed Amar writes of the transformation of the Second Amendment from
its original fear of the federal standing army to an individual rights basis. See
Amar, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 40, at 1260-62.
542. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (limiting the scope of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause because otherwise all important rights would
be subject to federal supervision); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842)
(holding that the Fugitive Slave Clause was a fundamental, partially self-executing,
article, but could not be supplemented by state laws upon recapture of a slave).
543. See BOBBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 51, at'61 (discussing pruden-
tial argument, Bobbitt's term for what this Article calls consequentialist argument).
544. See id. ("[Consequentialists] generally hold that in times of national emergency
even the plainest of constitutional limitation can be ignored.").
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alleging that if certain types of speech are allowed to occur, bad
things will happen. As we saw, Schenck applied such a test, ar-
ticulating the concern that the safety and well being of society
were put at risk by the defendants' speech." The communist
cases, especially Dennis, rested on the similar fear that without
taking action now against those who conspired to advocate over-
throw of the government in the future, we left the door open too
widely to those unacceptable consequences-even if no such rev-
olution ever would be attempted.546
Following the communist cases, however, these arguments
decisively were rejected. A doctrinalist might have some difficul-
ties explaining the shift from American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds,54  Dennis, and Barenblatt v. United States5 48  to
Shelton v. Tucker,5 49 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee,550 and Bond v. Floyd.55' A consequentialist, how-
ever, would not, because he simply would point out that times,
litigants, and attitudes had changed.
The new conclusion was that the earlier decisions mistakenly
had inverted the risks. Properly understood, the First Amend-
545. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); supra notes 96-102 and ac-
companying text.
546. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) ("[Aln attempt to over-
throw the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of in-
adequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to
prevent.").
547. 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding the validity of section 9(h) of the National La-
bor Relations Act, which denied certification benefits to labor organizations that
failed to file non-Communist affidavits, on the grounds that Communists in Union
leadership positions represented a serious threat of disruptive political strikes).
548. 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (sustaining the conviction of an individual who refused to
testify before the House Subcommittee on Un-American Activities, because the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing a Communist revolution outweighed individual First
Amendment rights).
549. 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down an Arkansas requirement that teachers list
organizations to which they belong on the grounds that such a requirement deprived
individuals of their right of associational freedom).
550. 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (reversing the conviction of the President of the Miami
NAACP, who refused to comply with a legislative order to divulge membership re-
cords, on the grounds that, given the lack of evidence of Communist activity, the
right to associate outweighed the state's interest).
551. 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (holding that Georgia's refusal to seat a duly elected
black representative because of his open opposition to the United States' Vietnam
policy was a violation of the representative's First Amendment rights).
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ment was designed to preclude government from assessing the
risks as it did because the risk that government will overprotect
the status quo is always greater than the risk of lawless ac-
tion,552 absent an incitement to imminent lawlessness.553
That same rejection of earlier rules through consequentialism
explains the failure of the recent efforts to suppress either por-
nography or hate speech. Efforts to strip hitherto protected
speech of its enshrined shelter, by creating new categories of
unprotected speech, relied on two premises: first, the speech in
question was not valuable, and second, it caused harm. Pornog-
raphy creates violence against women.554 Hate speech silences
and stigmatizes its victims.555
Even assuming that the claimed harm actually does flow from
the speech, the speech still may be protected. Of course, speech
may cause harms; otherwise there would never be any reason
for anyone to wish to censor it. For First Amendment purposes,
the risks of overreaction, of a majority taking its anger and fear
out on a despised minority, nevertheless precludes regulation
even if the majority makes a strong case that the failure to regu-
late will exacerbate the harms. The consequentialist argument
favoring regulation fails because an alternative consequentialist
argument prevails: If speech turns to action, the actor will be
punished, and this is sufficient even if it necessarily means that
some harms will go unredressed.
Both sides of the First Amendment debate recognize that
words wound. If only guns and bullets could be so limited in
their effects. Instead, guns and bullets kill. In 1985 some
665,000 crimes-that is about 1800 a day-were committed with
552. Justice Douglas was especially emphatic about this point in his concurring
opinion in Brandenburg. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969)
(Douglas, J., concurring); supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
553. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
554. The Indianapolis City Council found that pornography harmed women socially
and promoted physical violence. Holding that adult women can protect themselves
from being victimized by pornography a federal court struck down the city's anti-
pornography ordinance. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323
(7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
555. The City of St. Paul adopted an "anti-hate speech" ordinance designed to protect
individuals from victimization. The Supreme Court found that the ordinance, on its
face, violated the First Amendment. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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guns. In 1986 and 1987 there were about 40,000 murders per
year, with sixty percent being committed with guns-that is
roughly eighty per day. Especially since the Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Kennedy assassinations, it has been easy to make the
case that guns are evil and their elimination effectively would
reduce violence in an admittedly violent society.556 In the
1960s and 1970s, the robbery rate jumped sixfold and the mur-
der rate doubled, while handgun ownership also doubled.55
Common sense demonstrates that gun availability has a net
positive effect on both the frequency and seriousness of violent
acts. That is the consequentialist argument for limiting the
Second Amendment to something sensible, like hunting rifles.
The argument has been in full-flower for three decades and is
"now the editorial opinion of virtually every influential newspa-
per and magazine... ,,55
But guns don't kill, people do. We do not ban words just be-
cause they cause harm; Second Amendment supporters claim
that the same should be true for guns. An obvious criticism of
this argument is that the harms caused by guns are more cer-
tain and are of greater magnitude than are harms caused by
words. If words actually killed eighty people each day, there
would be much higher demand for regulation, and that demand
would beget a supply.
Indeed, as a First Amendment observer, I am accustomed to
seeing regulations of speech: peijury, fraud, incitement, obsceni-
ty, and the ubiquitous broadcast "indecency." What seems sur-
prising to me is that, given the differences in consequences,
there is not more regulation of guns.
What may seem surprising, however, is that the conclusion
that guns were evil and that eliminating them would be an effi-
cacious way of reducing violence occurred prior to any scholar-
ship on those factual assumptions. As Frank Zimring and
Gordon Hawkins, two of the important original researchers have
noted, those who believe in gun control did not feel "any great
556. Cf. FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GuN
CONTROL xi (1987).
557. See Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,




need for factual support to buttress [their] foregone conclusions"
because they assumed that the conclusions were self-evidently
true.559 Serious research only began in the mid-1970s.560
That research offers conclusions ranging from the intuitive to
the surprising. First, not all laws deter equally. Given the num-
ber of guns in society, it is far more likely that responsible indi-
viduals who never would use guns criminally will yield up their
weapons than will the irresponsible and criminal gun own-
ers.5"' Second, using a gun to commit a crime may be a wash
so far as violence goes. When aggressors have guns they are less
likely to physically attack their victims, and less likely to injure
the victim given an attack, but more likely to kill the victim, if
an injury occurs.562
The initial debate never considered the victim as anything but
a passive nonactor. Gary Kieck, whose recent book, Point Blank,
was declared by the American Society of Criminologists to be the
single-most important contribution to criminology in the previ-
ous several years, changed the debate by considering the victim
and the effects of self-defense attempts.563 Although serious de-
bate about the number of times a gun is used in self-defense
continues,5 there seems to be some agreement that doing so
is effective and that the incidence of self-defense use was decid-
edly underestimated by the researchers who concluded that
armed aggressors are more likely to inflict fatal injuries.6 5
When victims resist with a gun, they are less likely to be at-
tacked, injured, or robbed.66 Indeed, Kleck concludes that a
victim who submits is far more likely to be injured than one who
559. See ZnIRING & HAWKINS, supra note 556, at xi. They note an identical atti-
tude on the part of those who oppose gun control. See id.
560. See Don B. Kates, Jr., et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or
Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 525 (1995).
561. See id. at 527.
562. See Gary Kieck, Address to the National Academy of Sciences/National Re-
search Council Panel on the Understanding and Prevention of Violence (April 3,
1990), quoted in id. at 525.
563. GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GuNs AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1991).
564. Numbers range from 2,000,000 to just under 100,000 per year. See Kates et
al., supra note 560, at 537-38.
565. See id. at 539-42.
566. See KLECK, supra note 563, at 149 tbl.4.
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resists with a gun, but far less likely to be injured than someone
resisting with any other weapon.567
Certainly, I lack the expertise to decide this debate. I am
enough of a realist, however, to understand that the view that
gun control may not yield any benefits will not prevail even if it
is correct. The issue is far too emotional. For legislative purpos-
es, it seems safe to say that if the standards of due process or
equal protection are applied to a general ban on guns, the ban
would be valid because reasonable legislatures should be free to
decide either way. If the Second Amendment has any substance,
however, then the evidence is far too ambiguous to support a
general ban, no matter how intuitive the ban might be. Propo-
nents of a ban throw out data about guns and violence with a
res ipsa loquitur tag.56 As Kieck has shown, however, the evi-
dence does not speak entirely for itself and it contains a number
of contested premises."9 Other constitutional rights are not
overridden based on such contested data and conclusions. That
is the key. If the Amendment has substance, then it creates
presumptions that tilt the debate.
On a final consequentialist note, no one can read any Second
Amendment literature without realizing that the "holocaust ar-
gument" looms large.57° If there is a well-armed citizenry, then
the government will be reluctant to begin policies of oppression
that could lead to a holocaust. Is it a sufficient answer that this
does not sound like the United States?57 Would a neutral ob-
server think it sounded like Germany in 1900 or Bosnia in
1984-when the Olympics were held in Sarajevo?
567. See id. Of robbery and assault targets, respectively, 17.4% and 12.1% who
resisted with guns were injured; 24.7% and 27.3% of those who submitted were in-
jured; 29.5% and 40.3% of those who resisted with a knife were injured; and, 22%
and 25.1% of those who resisted with some other kind of weapon were injured.
568. This certainly is the position of the public health literature. See Kates et al.,
supra note 560, at 547, 552.
569. See generally KLECK, supra note 563, at 101-319.
570. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, Second Thoughts on the Second Amendment, ATLAN-
TIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1996, at 32, 44; Reynolds, supra note 7, at 482-83.




Because moral philosophy or natural law normally offer guid-
ance where the Constitution seems not to, they may be useful in
the analysis of Ninth Amendment or substantive due process
cases, but little else. Thus, moral philosophy and natural law
are absent from First Amendment analysis for the obvious rea-
son that other modalities of interpretation yield relevant infor-
mation. This is not to say that moral philosophy could not be
used; the First Amendment may rest on something more than a
belief that speech and a free press must be protected because
governments possess an inherent desire to entrench themselves
and their views."'
If the First Amendment does rest on something more than the
well-founded distrust of government, then that something is
likely to be found in philosophy, as the current followers of Alex-
ander Meiklejohn assert in their efforts to theorize about the
necessary limits on freedom of expression."' Like Meiklejohn,
they have disdain for the speech of the people, coupled with high
respect for the speech of those who claim to know what the peo-
ple want. 74 Unlike Meiklejohn, who attempted to overprotect
the class of speech he favored, his current followers use rights
philosophy in conjunction with, but intended as a substitute for,
consequentialism, in their desire to narrow the range of protect-
ed speech and speakers.575 The fact remains, however, that the
Court really has not been animated by such concerns.
Moral philosophy and natural law arguments may appear in
Second Amendment argument because the Court's Second
572. My writings reflect that I believe this is what the First Amendment is about,
and, indeed that the history of broadcast regulation demonstrates the wisdom of that
conclusion. See generally LUCAS A. PoWE, BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1987); POWE, supra note 105.
573. See CASS SUNSTEN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993);
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) (argu-
ing that sometimes the speech of some citizens must be restricted in order to
strengthen the relative voice of others); Fiss, supra note 212 (arguing that the State
should play a legitimate role in regulating speech).
574. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT 22-27 (1948) (arguing that, because radio had not fulfilled what Meiklejohn
saw as its potential, it was not entitled to any constitutional protection).
575. See Fiss, supra note 212, at 790-94.
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Amendment analysis is so barren. Indeed, one article claiming a
right to bear arms is subtitled: An Individual Right to Arms
Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment.576
At the time of the Framing, self-defense was perceived as an
important individual right. Among others, Thomas Hobbes and
St. George Tucker viewed self-defense as the first law of na-
ture,577 and while much else may have changed in the ensuing
centuries, I doubt that this sentiment has. Instead, an argument
against the self-defense rationale would be a consequentialist
variant of "times change": more guns beget more problems and
the creation of professional police forces obviates the need for
weaponry to be used in self-defense.
Let us first ask how a homeowner might choose to protect her-
self in her home. One answer might be to request and obtain in-
creased police patrols of the neighborhood. If the available re-
sources do not allow this, she could call "911" when the security
of her home is breached or threatened. What if, because of well-
documented police negligence, or simply a lack of resources, as-
sistance is not forthcoming? One could reply that our legal sys-
tem, inexact though it may be, at least offers compensation for
injury, but in this case one would be wrong.
Under the facts just suggested, the injured homeowner or her
heirs would be unsuccessful in a suit against the police force or
local government.57 She would learn that absent unusual cir-
cumstances, not present in this situation, the police owe her no
duty to come to her aid. The duties of the police go to the people
collectively, not to any specific individual.579 At least this dem-
576. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right
to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992) (arguing
that a right to arms indeed springs from the Ninth Amendment). Nelson Lund took
a similar view without fully dressing it in Ninth Amendment garb. See Nelson Lund,
The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA.
L. REV. 103, 123 (1987) (asserting that the right to self-protection is "fundamentally
rooted in our political traditions").
577. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 107 (E.P. Dutton ed., 1950) ("[Tlhe [sum] of
the Right of Nature . . . is, By all means we can, to defend our selves."); 1 TUCKER'S
BLACKSTONE, supra note 407, at app. at 300 ("The right of self defence is the first
law of nature . . ").
578. See, e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) (en banc)
(absolving the police department of any civil liability for failure to provide adequate
police services).
579. See id. at 3.
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onstrates a true collective rights theory. The police cannot re-
spond to every call, or be everywhere under the limited resourc-
es allocated to them by society; thus there is no specific duty to
be anywhere and no liability.
Let us move from a hypothetical to a real case. Martha Bethel
is a city judge in Montana's Bitterroot Valley."' A defendant
in her court claimed to be a "freeman," and therefore not bound
by Montana's laws requiring a driver's license, car registration,
and insurance.5"' The freeman served Bethel with a legal-look-
ing document from a so-called "common law court," informing
her that unless all charges against him were dropped, a warrant
for her arrest would be issued and she would be tried for crimi-
nal and treasonous actions.8 2 Instead, when the freeman failed
to appear for trial, Bethel issued a warrant for his arrest.8 '
Thereafter, she was followed home from the courthouse at night,
received an anonymous call confirming the exact location of her
house, and subsequently received death threats.5" When she
asked for a police escort and protection, the sheriff refused, stat-
ing that he lacked the staff.5" The FBI (properly) declined ju-
risdiction."' The freeman is now a fugitive and Bethel is-
scared.58 7 What should she do?588
[A] government and its agents are under no general duty to provide pub-
lic services, such as police protection, to any particular individual citi-
zen. . . . The duty to provide public services is owed to the public at
large, and, absent a special relationship between the police and an indi-
vidual, no specific legal duty exists.
Id.
580. See Stephanie Mansfield, Nightmare in Big Sky Country, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING,





585. See id. There was a similar case in New York, in which the victim made "re-
peated and almost pathetic pleas for aid [which] were received with little more than
indifference." Riss v. New York City, 240 N.E.2d 860, 862 (N.Y. 1968). The victim
then was blinded in one eye, lost a good portion of her vision in the other, and was
permanently scarred when lye was thrown in her face. See id. She lost her case
against the police on the same rationale as did the claimants in Warren: "Because
[the city] owe[s] a duty to everybody, [the city] owe[s] it to nobody." Id.
586. See Mansfield, supra note 580, at 137.
587. See id.
588. She sleeps with a semiautomatic rifle under the bed, monitors a police radio,
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Should we tell Bethel that if she arms herself, she becomes
the criminal? Is there any moral way to tell her that we cannot
protect her, so that her practical options are to pray, to move, or
to violate the law in order to defend herself? Note that the first
two options are constitutional rights.5 9 Drawing on fundamen-
tal rights analysis, the final option might be as well."'
If the argument that she has a fundamental right to defend
herself works for Bethel, it should work for the security-seeking
homeowner as well. The difference in their situations is largely
that Bethel fears one man and the homeowner fears many. That
is not a difference of constitutional dimension.
What, then, of the rights of the freeman in his claim that he
needs arms to fight against the despotic governments of Montana
and the United States? If his argument appeals to natural law,
he is going to lose as a matter of positive law. It is all but impos-
sible to imagine an adjudicator listening to a natural law argu-
ment under the Constitution against the Constitution, although
it is conceivable that the freeman might prevail under either
historical or structural argument.59' It is equally unlikely that
the freeman could make a natural rights argument to be in ei-
ther an unorganized or an organized militia. Wherever that right
is established, it is neither moral philosophy nor natural law.
I implied at the beginning of this section that a moral philoso-
phy/natural rights argument is the last refuge of a constitutional
keeps her drapes stapled shut and has a planned escape route into the nearby cot-
tonwoods. See id.
589. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (travel); Abington Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941) (travel).
590. See United States v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 846, 850 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a justification defense is available under federal law that makes it criminal for
a felon to be in possession of a firearm). Gomez was indicted on two counts of being
a felon in possession of a firearm. See id. at 849. However, he had a legitimate jus-
tification, insofar as he was under the threat of death or serious injury after being
named as an informant in a solicitation of murder indictment against an alleged
drug conspirator. See id. at 851-52. The government disclosed Gomez's name in the
indictment, without ever warning him that they were planning to do so. See id. at
848-49. As introduced by Judge Kozinski, "This case gives fresh meaning to the
phrase, 'I'm from the government and I'm here to help you.'" Id. at 848.
591. Cf. The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), ("Where a meaning is clear, the consequences,
whatever they may be are to be admitted. . . ."), in 13 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, su-
pra note 187, at 372, 374 (discussing the proper interpretation of the Constitution).
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loser because by definition it cannot be grounded elsewhere in
the Constitution.592 The self-defense argument flowing from
Hobbes to Bethel's situation, however, can be grounded rather
easily in historical or traditional argument. Thus to the extent it
resonates, it is likely to reinforce the conclusion that the histori-
cal dore of the Second Amendment includes a right to arm for
self-defense, just as the Pennsylvania and Vermont constitutions
stated in the 1770s.59 More broadly, these observations sup-
port Bobbitt's claim that rights-based analysis is not a legiti-
mate modality of constitutional argument.5 94 Indeed, at least in
areas removed from due process or the Ninth Amendment, it
seems parasitical, because, when it is likely to succeed, it does
so by illuminating an argument under an accepted modality.
III. CONCLUSION
If we leave the freemen of Montana and return to Linda
Thompson of the Unorganized Militia, the easiest thing to note
is that I analyzed the First Amendment issues in purely doctrin-
al terms. All of the issues raised by her statements have gone
before the Supreme Court and have been authoritatively an-
swered. In fact, the First Amendment is such a mature area of
the law that it is possible to illustrate all the modalities with
actual cases.
The Second Amendment analysis, in contrast, provides the
useful reminder that serious constitutional analysis is possible
without judicial precedents. Indeed, the Second Amendment
demonstrates that when the precedents are few, doing constitu-
tional law by examining text, history, structure, consequences,
and tradition is likely to yield a far more complete and textured
analysis than attempts to divine the meaning of a handful of
Supreme Court decisions.595 This analysis is a marked im-
provement over simple Second Amendment originalism as well.
592. See supra text preceding note 572.
593. See supra text accompanying notes 279-80.
594. See Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TaX. L. REV. 1869,
1910-11 (1994).
595. I concede that this analysis is not particularly helpful to the second-order ap-
plication issues of what weapons may be possessed.
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When I began this Article, I thought that I knew its likely
outcome, but I did not care what that was. In one sense, I am
not surprised that doing constitutional law supports an individu-
al rights view of the Second Amendment; many fine scholars had
reached that conclusion before me. What did surprise me was
how much Second Amendment analysis parallels First Amend-
ment analysis. Consequently, if we take the First Amendment
seriously, it is extremely difficult not to do so with the Second.
Yet we know that has not been the case. In Justice Cardozo's
words, the First Amendment is the "indispensable condition" of
our liberties.59 The Second Amendment, by contrast, seems a
dated relic of the eighteenth century. However much Second
Amendment analysis parallels the analysis of the First, this di-
chotomy still seems real and the reasons are bundled in a package
of opposites: representative government versus nonrepresentative
government, speech versus action, and individual versus group.
Freedom of speech could have been inferred from either the
Guaranty Clause597 or the fact that the Federal Government
was also republican. If we are to have republican government,
then we must have republican deliberation. As we increase the
franchise, through state policies and constitutional amendment,
freedom of speech and the press are essential attributes of the
representative government being created. Freedom of speech
loses none of its rationale in a move from nonrepresentative to
representative government.
The Second Amendment does not fare so well. The Country
Whig ideology and the American Revolution saw the armed peo-
ple as a check on a nonrepresentative government. The armed
people constituted the "palladium of liberty"59 because liberty
always is at risk when sovereignty rests in any place other than
the people. It is unclear to me how well anyone understood the
functions and purposes of an armed populace in a fully represen-
tative country. After all, no one had lived in such a world. This
may be where the First and Second Amendment traditions fully
596. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
597. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every state in
this union a Republican Form of Government .. ).




split-especially if we cannot claim to have been a fully repre-
sentative democracy prior to implementation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 599
Once we established a representative democracy, why should-
n't the First Amendment, in combination with the ballot box, be
a sufficient check on government? It should go without saying
that resort to the ballot box must precede a resort to arms. Those
who would make no effort to change the system peacefully cannot
be heard to claim that it is necessary to change it by force. Even
the Communists proffered political candidates and would have
accepted victory through ballots if it had been possible.
But what if speaking and voting fail? First, what does it mean
to fail? To lose a fair election? Consider Washington's actions in
putting down the Whiskey Rebellion.0 0 The whiskey rebels
mimicked the arguments of the Revolution in complaining of
taxation without representation.60' From Washington's per-
spective the difference was that the tea and stamp taxes had in
fact been passed without representation, but the whiskey rebels
"had three members in the House, although their actual popula-
tion justified only two."0 2 Their actions were therefore illegiti-
mate and force was justified in putting down the rebellion.
What if a group loses not one, but rather a series of fair elec-
tions like the Communists did? If this is the case, it will not
come as a surprise that the majority will use all necessary
means to suppress the revolt. But what if the group loses a
rigged election, or somehow a majority takes on the attributes of
a despotic government and turns the tyranny of the majority
into reality? Then we return to a theory that animated the Sec-
ond Amendment, a theory that seems more consistent with a
599. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 116-18 (1996).
600. See RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASH-
INGTON 88 (1996).
601. See id. at 90.
602. See JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON: ANGUISH AND FAREvELL
(1793-1799), at 164 (1969); see also THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION
120 (1986) (noting that Washington spoke disparagingly of the rebellious Western
Pennsylvanians, because the money raised from the tax was being used to protect
from Indians the very community opposing the tax).
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nonrepresentative government than does one in which the fran-
chise is shared widely.
Still, it is theoretically possible for a fully democratic majority
to systematically oppress a weaponless minority, so that minori-
ty may be remediless. The Framers knew that previous republics
had been lost; although representative government is a great
guarantee that the liberties of the people will be respected, it is
not a complete guarantee. Nothing is a complete guarantee.
I do not have full answers for these explicit and implicit ques-
tions, but they leave me skeptical about how conditions support-
ing rebellion could justify resort to arms rather than the ballot.
Near the end of his career, Justice Douglas, the strongest Su-
preme Court supporter of free speech, spoke to this issue. In a
case involving the criminal anarchy statute used in Gitlow °3
(and clearly unconstitutional under Brandenburg), he neverthe-
less refused to strike down an indictment that included advoca-
cy, but also charged "overt acts [which] relate to the acquisition
of weapons, gunpowder, and the like, and the storing of gasoline
to start fires. Persuasion by such means plainly has no First
Amendment protection."" 4 What would he have said to advo-
cating shooting politicians in conjunction with joining the armed
but "unorganized" militia?
Perhaps that unorganized militia offers a beginning for creat-
ing harmony between the First and the Second Amendments.
Justice Jackson's First Amendment concern about people band-
ing together to "'gang up' on the Government""5 or their fellow
citizens is salient and suggests a Second Amendment corollary:
military groups not under state control are per se dangerous and
are not constitutionally protected."' Ironically, Presser was ul-
timately right, albeit for the wrong reasons."7 Van Alstyne's
textual reasoning, that the right is to keep and bear arms, not
603. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
604. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
605. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 577 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
606. Several western state constitutions prohibit private armies although they pro-
tect the right to bear arms. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 26-123 (West 1956);
IDAHO CODE § 46-802 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 203.080 (Michie 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.120 (West 1961); WYO. STAT. § 19-1-106 (Michie 1977).
607. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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the right to belong to a militia,"8 is not only correct; it is pre-
scient.0 9
Action without the concert of others, however, is different. The
Bill of Rights creates spheres of autonomy from government in
which individuals can choose whether to exercise a set of guar-
antees. The Second Amendment is no less a part of these guar-
antees than speech, religion, protection from self-incrimination,
or the right to be paid if government takes your property. The
Second Amendment's pedigree and birth certificate are remark-
ably similar to the First's, and the Second Amendment is enti-
tled to meaning if meaning can be suggested sensibly. Thus, like
all other constitutional law scholars who have taken the time to
analyze the Second Amendment, I join with them reluctantly
singing the Monkees' refrain: "I'm a believer."6 10
But saying "I believe" nevertheless requires some answer to
the query "in what?" The First Amendment's underlying dichoto-
my between speech and action is helpful. Beginning with Justice
Brandeis in Whitney, the dominant First Amendment conclusion
has been the rejection of a tort-like theory of causation.6 ' The
First Amendment has been interpreted to preclude ascription of
causation to the speaker, unless the action is immediate. In-
stead, the cause of the harm is the actor who commits the
nonspeech act. We do not convict the person who advocates
shooting officials; we do convict those who attempt to fire the
shots. Still, this dichotomy between speech and action places the
Second Amendment in an unhappy position. Buying, possessing,
and carrying a gun, from a First Amendment perspective, are
action. At that point, First Amendment doctrine allows the State
to act in response.
It gets worse when the individual possessing a weapon joins
with other similarly situated individuals. The First Amendment
608. See Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1242-44.
609. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 511 n.222.
610. THE MONKEES, I'm A Believer, on MORE OF THE MONKEES (Colgems Records,
1967). I should note that had I written a passing reference some years ago, as Ely
did, see supra note 32, I am sure that it would have been no more insightful than
his statements. Those writing in the 1990s lack the same excuse.
611. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The culmination of this trend was Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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tradition, rightly or wrongly, always has celebrated the lone dis-
senter. When that dissenter joins with others, his dissent may
look like conspiracy. That is the teaching of the communist cas-
es, and it still lives, at least in situations where the "conspira-
612tors" acquire weapons.
If we import a speech/action dichotomy into the Second
Amendment and the First Amendment determination that get-
ting a gun is action applies, then the Second Amendment has no
meaning. Because this cannot be true where sensible alterna-
tives exist, the rule against prior restraints offers a sound mean-
ing. The Second Amendment should be interpreted to guarantee
an individual right to keep and bear appropriate arms, but no
right to -use them unlawfully and no right to join with other in-
dividuals in an armed band not controlled by the state.613
This, naturally, leads to the question that I announced I was
avoiding from the outset: What arms are appropriate? The an-
swer to that question should be determined by open, rational,
and fair debate, while recognizing that the Second Amendment
is a "real" part of the Constitution. As a contrary illustration,
consider the incredible exchange on the floor of the House of
Representatives on March 21, 1996, during the debate over re-
peal of the assault weapons ban. It began with Representative
Patrick Kennedy shaking in anger, and concluded with Repre-
sentative Gerald Solomon pointing at Kennedy and shouting the
conclusion of his response.
[Kennedy:] Families like mine all across this country know
all too well what the damage of weapons can do. And you
want to arm our people even more. You want to add more
magazines to the assault weapons so they can spray and kill
even more people. Shame on you! What in the world are you
thinking when you're opening up the debate on this issue?
My God! All I have to say to you is play with the devil, die
with the devil! There are families out there you'll never
612. Cf Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
613. See, e.g., Joelle E. Polesky, Comment, The Rise of Private Militia: A First and
Second Amendment Analysis of the Right to Organize and the Right to Train, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1593 (1996) (concluding that the Second Amendment grants the states
the power to regulate the militia and the possession of weapons related to the mili-
tia and therefore private militias find no protection in the Constitution).
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know... Mr. Chairman, you'll never [kinow what it's like
because you don't have someone in your family killed. It's not
the person who['s] killed, it's the whole family that's affected.
You're asking the wrong question! It's not about crime. It's
about the families and victims of crime. That's what we're
advocating in proposing this ban, and that's why we should
keep this ban in place....
[Solomon:] I have great respect for he and his family, but I'm
going to tell you something. When he stands up and ques-
tions the integrity of those of us that have this bill on the
floor, the gentlemen ought to be a little more careful. And let
me tell you why! ...
[Kennedy:] Tell me ....
[Solomon:] My wife live[s] alone five days a week in a rural
area in upstate New York! She has the right to defend herself
when I'm not there, son! And don't you ever-
[Kennedy:] -know the facts about this-
[Solomon:] -forget it. Don't you ever forget it!614
Kennedy, whose argument could apply to any weapon, implic-
itly.believed that the Constitution was irrelevant to the issues of
gun control; Solomon seemed to believe that the Second Amend-
ment was absolute (and that his wife might need an Uzi). Clear-
ly both are wrong. If the Second Amendment debate were taken
seriously, maybe the First Amendment debate on the Second
Amendment would be taken seriously too.
614. 142 CONG. REC. H2675 (1996).
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